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DOES NEPA MATTER?-AN ANALYSIS OF THE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONTEMPORARY
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT
Kenneth M. Murchison*
When President Nixon signed the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA)' on January 1, 1970, he declared that the new
statute marked the arrival of the time for environmental action.2
The quantatitive measures of legislative and judicial activity dur-
ing the ensuing decade suggest that he accurately captured the
mood of the times, for the 1970's produced a flurry of new and
amended statutes 3 as well as a veritable explosion in environmen-
tal litigation.4 As a result of this burst of energy, environmental
law has emerged as an important legal speciality5 that now com-
mands the attention of law schools, government lawyers, and the
private bar, in addition to the environmental groups who domi-
nated the field in its early years.
Now that environmental law has matured into a relatively well-
defined field of law, it is necessary to evaluate the significance of
the various constituent parts. This article ventures such an evalua-
tion of NEPA. The article begins with an overview of the statute
and its legislative history and then offers a detailed summary of its
* Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Roger Anderson for his careful critique of
an earlier draft of this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
2. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1970, at A12, col. 6 ("I have become further convinced that the
nineteen seventies absolutely must be the years when America pays its debt to the past by
reclaiming the purity of its air, its waters, and our living environment.").
3. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767; Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91
Stat. 1567; Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; Resource, Con-
servation, and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2796; Noise Control Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
604, 84 Stat. 1676.
4. The Environmental Law Reporter (ENvTL. L. INST.) began reporting environmental
cases in 1970 and now includes 17 volumes.
5. See generally M. GILLAM, POLLUTION LAW: CRYSTALLIZATION OF A FIELD OF INTEREST
AND SPECIALTY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1976).
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judicial interpretation and administrative implementation. After
completing this survey of NEPA's development, the article then
analyzes its current significance as a vehicle for protecting the
environment.
I. THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Proposals for a congressional declaration of environmental policy
surfaced on various occasions during the 1960's.1 One of the princi-
pal advocates of such a declaration was Senator Henry Jackson,
who introduced the Senate bill that eventually became NEPA. Al-
though Senator Jackson's bill did not contain a declaration of pol-
icy as originally introduced,7 a committee amendment s soon added
such a declaration together with provisions recognizing that "each
person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful envi-
ronment" and imposing requirements designed to force federal
agencies to implement the statutory policy. Among these "action-
forcing" provisions was a requirement that responsible officials
make findings concerning the probable environmental impact of all
major agency actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment. Following the adoption of these amendments,
the bill was unanimously passed by the Senate without debate.,
When the Senate bill reached the House, it was amended by
substituting a much more restrained version.10 The House bill con-
tained a much shorter declaration of purpose, included no recogni-
tion of the right to a healthful environment, omitted the "action-
forcing" provisions of the Senate bill, and added a section declar-
ing that "nothing in this Act shall increase, decrease, or change
any responsibility of any Federal official or agency.""
The Senate refused to accept the House amendments and re-
quested that a conference committee be appointed. The Senate
6. For general discussions of NEPA's legislative history, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE
COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AT 1-14 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS]; R. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT 7-19 (1976).
7. S. 1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
8. Hearing on S. 1075, S. 237 and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 207 (1969) (Appendix 2) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
9. 115 CONG. REC. 19,009-13 (1969).




also made several de facto amendments in its own bill by in-
structing its conferees to insist on provisions that were not in-
cluded in the bill as originally passed. 2 One new provision de-
clared that neither NEPA's declaration of policy nor its action-
forcing provisions affected
in any way . . . the specific statutory obligations of any Federal
agency (1) to comply with criteria or standards of environmental
quality, (2) to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or state
agency, or (3) to act, or refrain from acting, contingent on the rec-
ommendations or certification of any other Federal or State
agency.13
A second new provision changed the requirement that the respon-
sible official make a finding regarding the environmental impact of
proposals for major federal actions. The new provision required
that the official prepare a "detailed statement" analyzing the envi-
ronmental impacts of such actions. 4
The conference committee returned an amended version of the
original Senate bill. In addition to accepting the Senate's own
amendments, the committee made several other changes.'5 One
change substituted a recognition that everyone "should enjoy a
healthful environment"'16 for the Senate bill's declaration of a
"right" to such an environment. Another change modified the obli-
gation of all federal agencies to comply with the action-forcing pro-
visions by inserting the qualifying phrase "to the fullest extent
possible."' 7
Both houses passed the conference version, and it became law on
January 1, 1970.18 Title I of the statute, which contains the con-
gressional policy declarations and the action-forcing provisions im-
12. 115 CONG. REc. 29,087-89 (1969) (Senate discussion of conference committee's posi-
tion on NEPA); id. at 29,058-59 (description of changes). The changes were endorsed by
Senators Muskie and Jackson in prepared statements. Id. at 29,051-53.
13. Id. at 29,058-59.
14. Id. at 29,053 & 29,058.
15. For a summary of changes other than those discussed in the text, see R. ANDREWS,
supra note 6, at 13-14.
16. H.R. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969). The House managers explained that
the compromise language was adopted because of their doubts "with respect to the legal
scope of the original Senate provision." Id.
17. Id. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE CouRTs, supra note 6, at 9, for a brief explanation
of the conflicting interpretations of this language.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4346 (1982).
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plementing the declaration, consisted of five sections which are
summarized below.' 9
Section 101 announced congressional policy. After declaring
Congress' recognition of modern threats to the environment and of
"the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmen-
tal quality to the overall welfare and development of man," subsec-
tion (a) declared, in general terms, the policy of the Federal gov-
ernment "to use all practicable means and measures . . . in a
manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of Ameri-
cans."20 To carry out this policy, subsection (b) of section 101 es-
tablished the "continuing policy of the Federal Government to use
all practical means, consistent with other essential considerations
of national policy to improve and coordinate Federal plans, func-
tions, programs and resources" to achieve six goals: (1) fulfilling
"the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations;" (2) assuring "safe, productive,
and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings" for all
Americans; (3) attaining "the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment without . . . undesirable and unintended conse-
quences;" (4) preserving "our national heritage" and maintaining,
"wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity, and
variety of individual choice;" (5) achieving "a balance between
population and resource use;" and (6) enhancing "the quality of
renewable resources and approach[ing] the maximum attainable
recycling of depletable resources."' 21 Subsection (c) then closed
with the recognition "that each person should enjoy a healthful en-
19. In addition to the provisions summarized in the text, subchapter II of NEPA estab-
lished the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (1976). The
Council is composed of three members appointed by the President, and the Council's basic
duties are to prepare an annual report on the environment, and to evaluate, recommend,
and coordinate policies relating to NEPA and the environment. Under NEPA, the CEQ has
no direct enforcement powers and its primary responsibility has been to issue regulations
relating to the implementation of the statute's procedural provisions. In 1977, President
Carter ordered the heads of federal agencies to comply with CEQ's NEPA regulations. Exec.
Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. § 124 (1978). The Supreme Court has declared that "CEQ's
interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference." Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442
U.S. 347, 358 (1979). See generally N. ORLOFF & G. BROOKS, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY LAW ACT-CASES AND MATERIALS 39-44 (1980) (background on the relationship be-
tween NEPA and CEQ).




vironment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute
to the preservation and enhancement of the environment."2
Section 102 contained the action-forcing provisions that apply
"to the fullest extent possible." These provisions included a gen-
eral rule of construction for federal laws, regulations, and policies
as well as other requirements applicable to all federal agencies.
The rule of construction mandated that legal interpretation and
administrative implementation proceed "in accordance with the
policies set forth in [the] Act. '23 For the most part, the other re-
quirements contained relatively general directions to agencies. For
example, the agencies were to use "a systematic, interdisciplinary
approach . . . in planning and in decision-making, . . . [to] iden-
tify and develop methods and procedures . . . which will insure
that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in decision-making, . . .
[and to use] ecological information in the planning and develop-
ment of resource-oriented projects. '24
Two requirements were relatively more specific. Subsection
102(2)(C) directed that "every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment" should include a
"detailed statement by the responsible official." The subsection
also directed that this statement should "accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review process" and should address
five matters:
(i) The environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) Alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term pro-
ductivity, and
(v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.2"
22. Id.
23. Id. § 4332.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
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Another provision, subsection 102(2)(D), required agencies to
"[s]tudy, develop, and describe alternatives to recommended
courses of action" for all proposals that involved "unresolved con-
flicts concerning alternate uses of available resources."2 6
The remaining sections of title I addressed other specific mat-
ters. Section 103 imposed a requirement that all agencies review
their "statutory authority, administrative regulations, and current
policies" for "deficiencies and inconsistencies" prohibiting full
compliance with NEPA and that they propose any needed changes
to the President by July 1, 1971.21 Section 104 contained the lan-
guage of the Senate instruction to its conferees2" preserving "spe-
cific statutory obligations" by requiring compliance with environ-
mental standards, consultations with environmental agencies, or
certifications from environmental agencies.2 9 Finally, section 105
explicitly declared that NEPA's "policies and goals" were "supple-
mentary to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal
agencies."30
II. THE RISE OF JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
NEPA was silent with respect to one crucial point-how Con-
gress intended for it to be enforced. Although portions of the legis-
lative history contain references to judicial enforcement, other
passages suggest that the budgetary review process was to be the
principal means of enforcement.31 In any event, budgetary enforce-
ment never materialized3 2 and the courts quickly proved them-
selves willing to find that NEPA established judicially enforcible
obligations. As a result of this willingness, courts assumed much of
the burden of insuring compliance with NEPA,33 and the early ju-
26. Id. § 4332(2)(E).
27. Id. § 4333.
28. See supra text accompanying note 13.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1982).
30. Id. § 4335.
31. Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 116-17.
32. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS, supra note 6, at 11 (citing COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMM. ON FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE CONSER-
VATION, HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FED-
ERAL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969, at 51
(1972)).
33. The CEQ now exercises a limited administrative role in overseeing NEPA compliance.
See supra note 19. Even prior to the promulgation of Executive Order 11,991, the CEQ had
issued nonbinding "guidelines" to assist federal agencies in complying with NEPA's impact
statement requirement. See 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 (1973); 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971); N. ORLOFF
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dicial decisions form an important chapter in NEPA's history.
A. The Promise of Calvert Cliffs'
On December 3, 1970, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
promulgated rules outlining how NEPA would be implemented in
licensing proceedings for nuclear power plants. Opponents of these
rules challenged their adequacy in the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals and succeeded in having the rules set aside. In
what must be regarded as the seminal NEPA case, Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Com-
mission,34 the court ruled that the AEC rules did not comply with
NEPA and remanded them to the Agency for reconsideration.
The author of the Calvert Cliffs' opinion was Judge J. Skelly
Wright, perhaps the leading judicial activist currently serving as a
federal judge,35 and his very first paragraph set the tone for the
opinion. Judge Wright declared that NEPA was "the broadest and
perhaps the most important" of recent environmental statutes.
The judicial role in implementing these new statutes was to ensure
that "the promise of the new legislation will become a reality," and
to make certain "that important legislative purposes, heralded in
the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hall-
ways of the federal bureaucracy. "36
Judge Wright conceded that "NEPA, like so much other reform
legislation of the last 40 years, is cast in terms of a general man-
date and broad delegation of authority. 3 7 Nonetheless, he found
the policies embodied in the statute "a good deal clearer and more
& G. BROOKS, supra note 19, at 39-42.
34. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
35. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (recognizing an implied warranty of habitability in rented dwell-
ings); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (reversing a NASA employee's dismis-
sal that was based on his alleged homosexuality); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (refusing to enforce provision in security agreement on ground
of unconscionability); Hobson v. Hanse, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) (ordering extensive
busing for the public schools in the District of Columbia). But cf. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1977) (adopting extremely deferential
standard for reviewing EPA Administrator's determination that automobile emissions
caused by leaded gasoline "present[ed] a significant risk of harm" to the public). See also A.
MILLER, A CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE: THE JUDICIAL ODYSSEY OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT (1984). See
generally Wright, Professor Bicket, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
HARv. L. REV. 769 (1971) (Judge Wright outlines his philosophy of judicial activism).
36. Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1111.
37. Id.
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demanding than does the Commission." 3 He concluded that the
policies were sufficiently clear to support a judicial holding "that
the Commission's procedural rules do not comply with the congres-
sional policy." 39
In explaining the basis for this holding, Judge Wright offered a
comprehensive overview of the new statute, and this overview has
formed the framework of analysis for most subsequent NEPA liti-
gation. The "general substantive policy" established by section 101
was "a flexible one;" it left "room for a responsible exercise of dis-
cretion" and "probably" precluded a judicial reversal of "a sub-
stantive decision on the merits, . . . unless it be shown that the
[agency's decision] ...was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient
weight to environmental values. '40 By contrast, Judge Wright de-
scribed the action-forcing provisions of section 102 and the author-
ity granted all agencies in section 105 to consider environmental
factors in their decision making as "procedural" protections that
"establish[ed] a strict standard of compliance." '41 In particular, he
rejected the contention that the qualifying phrase "to the fullest
extent possible" made these procedural provisions discretionary.
To the contrary, he viewed this language as setting "a high stan-
dard for agencies," a standard that required compliance in all cases
except those where compliance would produce "a clear conflict of
statutory authority."42
Because Calvert Cliffs' involved only the adequacy of the AEC's
general rules for implementing NEPA, Judge Wright's analysis ad-
dressed only the "procedural" protections of NEPA. However, his
analysis demonstrated a willingness to apply those protections
strictly, and consequently he found the AEC rules inadequate in
four respects. First, the rules directed its hearing board to consider
environmental issues only when they were raised by a party to the
hearing proceedings. This conflicted with NEPA's mandate for
agencies to "consider the environmental impact of their actions 'to
the fullest extent possible.' "4 Second, the Commission's decision
to preclude consideration of environmental impacts in most licens-
ing decisions where the notice of hearing appeared less than three
38. Id. at 1112.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1112, 1115.
41. Id. at 1112.
42. Id. at 1115 (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at 1118-19.
[Vol. 18:557
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months after adoption of the rules conflicted with its statutory
duty to comply with NEPA's action-forcing provisions "to the
maximum extent possible.'" Third, the AEC rule precluding eval-
uation of environmental impacts when applicants secured certifica-
tions showing that they would not violate existing environmental
standards conflicted "with the basic purpose of the Act"-to man-
date "a case-by-case balancing judgment on the part of federal
agencies. '45 Fourth, the Commission's refusal to consider environ-
mental impacts in hearings concerning modification of previously
issued construction permits failed to meet the strict standard of
compliance applicable to the "procedural duties [of section 102,
which requires the agency] to give full consideration to environ-
mental protection. '4 6
Because the Atomic Energy Act contained an express provision
authorizing the District of Columbia Circuit Court to review the
Commission's rules, 47 Calvert Cliffs' did not need to address the
preliminary issues of jurisdiction, standing, and reviewability. Al-
though other courts had to face such issues, they generally con-
cluded that the courts had a significant role to play in enforcing
NEPA. When no statute specifically provided for judicial review,
the courts have found various other statutes, such as the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act48 and the general federal-question statute,49
sufficient to confer jurisdiction.50 The courts have also found that
persons alleging environmental injury had standing to litigate
44. Id. at 1119-22.
45. Id. at 1123.
46. Id. at 1128-29.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1970).
48. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Immediately following the enactment of NEPA, the federal-
question statute contained a $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement, but amendments
in 1976 and 1980 eliminated that element. Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (1980);
Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976).
50. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972) (relying on the Administrative Procedure Act); Coahoma Chem.
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Miss. 1973) (relying on the APA); Citizens for
Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (relying on both the
APA and the general federal-question statute); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis.
1971) (relying on both the APA and the federal question statute). But cf. National Helium
Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that NEPA itself implicitly con-
ferred jurisdiction). In Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), the Supreme Court ruled
that the APA is not a jurisdictional statute and that the plaintiffs must rely on other stat-
utes to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts. The significance of Califano
has been limited by the deletion of the amount-in-controversy requirement from the general
federal-question statute. See supra note 49.
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NEPA claims5 and that NEPA claims were reviewable 52 under the
Administrative Procedure Act.5 3 Many of these early decisions in-
volved development agencies (typically the Corps of Engineers and
the Federal Highway Administration), and cases following Calvert
Cliffs' generally displayed a willingness to engage in careful scru-
tiny of their actions for NEPA compliance. 4
B. The Threshold Determination: Whether an Impact State-
ment Must Be Prepared
The bulk of the reported decisions concern subsection 102(2)(C),
which requires the preparation of a "detailed statement" for all
"proposals for legislation or other major federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." Most of the ear-
liest NEPA cases involved the threshold decision not to prepare an
impact statement. These cases were based on allegations that the
agency failed to prepare a statement in a situation where one was
required. The discussion below summarizes these decisions by
grouping them into three categories: those addressing what stan-
dard of review applied to the threshold determination; those pro-
viding definitions for the principal statutory terms; and those de-
ciding whether the courts should imply exceptions for particular
types of actions.
1. Standard of Review
Because the level of judicial review employed can have a decisive
impact on a court's decision,5 5 an important preliminary question
in any judicial review of administrative action is what standard of
review the court will use in reviewing the agency decisions. NEPA
cases were no exception. Thus, how closely courts would review an
agency's decision not to prepare an impact statement was an im-
portant aspect of the initial batch of NEPA cases. Most of the
51. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See generally F. ANDERSON,
NEPA IN THE COURTS, supra note 6, at 29-44.
52. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. 338, 341 (W.D. Mo.
1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1973).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982).
54. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
55. See generally Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness
of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970) (discussing the limitations imposed on
judicial review of administrative agency determinations by the "rational basis" rule).
[Vol. 18:557
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early district court decisions56 applied the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard of the Administrative Procedure Act,57 but occa-
sional exceptions 58 meant that the issue would require resolution at
the circuit level.
The first circuit court decision to attempt to define the standard
of review for NEPA threshold determinations was Hanly v.
Kleindeinst.59 The Hanly court adopted the arbitrary-and-capri-
cious standard as the appropriate test for reviewing NEPA thresh-
old cases, but it qualified that deferential standard by requiring
the agency to compile an adequate administrative record docu-
menting that its decision was not arbitrary. Hanly even required
the agency to prepare a preliminary environmental analysis when
the initial information available to the agency indicated that the
proposal might have a significant impact on the environment.60
Just five weeks after the Second Circuit issued its Hanly opin-
ion, the Fifth Circuit suggested an alternate standard for reviewing
NEPA threshold determinations. The Fifth Circuit described the
threshold decision as a "jurisdiction-type conclusion" and con-
cluded in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger6 that courts should re-
view the decision not to prepare a statement "under a more re-
laxed rule of reasonableness, rather than by the narrower standard
of arbitrariness or capriciousnes's.' ' 2 The Fifth Circuit described
its standard as a two-part analysis. First, the court had to "deter-
mine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts which, if true, show
that the recommended project would materially degrade any as-
pect of environmental quality."63 Second, if the answer to the first
inquiry was positive, "the court should proceed to examine and
weigh the evidence of both the plaintiff and the agency to deter-
56. E.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 2 ENvT. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20,305 (S.D.
Ala. 1972), rev'd, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney,
334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971); Echo Park Residents Comm. v. Romney, 2 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INsT.) 20,037 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
58. See, e.g., Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886, 888 (W.D. Wis. 1971) ("[T]he court...
must construe the statutory standards... and, having construed them, then apply them to
the particular project, and decide whether the agency's failure violates the Congressional
command."), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 366 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (quoting Scherr).
59. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
60. Id. at 832.
61. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
62. Id. at 465.
63. Id. at 466.
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mine whether the agency reasonably could have concluded that the
particular project would have no effects which would significantly
degrade our environmental quality. 6 4 Save Our Ten Acres empha-
sized that this latter inquiry "need not be limited to consideration
of the administrative record"; the reviewing court could consider
"supplemental affidavits, depositions, and other proof concerning
the environmental impact of the project. . . if an inadequate evi-
dentiary development before the agency can be shown. '65
Although a Seventh Circuit decision accepted the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard of Hanly,66 most courts followed the lead of
Save Our Ten Acres. Eventually, the Eighth,67 Ninth, 8 Tenth,9
and District of Columbia 0 circuits adopted the reasonableness
standard as did district courts in the First,7 1 Third,7 2 Fourth,7 3 and
Sixth 7 4 circuits. These developments indicate that all of the cir-
cuits that considered the issue (even the Second Circuit, through
its requirement for an adequate administrative record) tried to
provide for significant judicial oversight in cases where agencies
elected not to prepare an environmental impact statement.
2. Definition of Statutory Terms
One of the time-honored methods through which courts control
administrative actions is by defining particular questions as "issues
of law" for which the judiciary is responsible.76 Courts regularly
employed this technique in the early NEPA cases to narrow agency
discretion in refusing to prepare an impact statement. In doing so,
they attempted to define at least four terms that describe the type
64. Id. at 467.
65. Id.
66. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1380 (7th Cir. 1973).
67. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1974).
68. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1975).
69. Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973).
70. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv.,
487 F.2d 1029, 1039 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
71. Mount Vernon Preservation Soc'y v. Clements, 415 F. Supp. 141, 146 (D.N.H. 1976).
72. E.g., Township of Ridley v. Blanchette, 421 F. Supp. 435, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Bor-
ough of Morrisville v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, 399 F. Supp. 469, 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
cf. Concord Township v. United States, 625 F.2d 1068, 1074 (3d Cir. 1980) ("There is much
to be said in favor of subjecting these threshold determinations to the higher scrutiny on
review.").
73. Conservation Council of N.C. v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653, 672 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 528
F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1975).
74. Joseph v. Adams, 467 F. Supp. 141, 154 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
75. See Sive, supra note 55, at 619-31.
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of proposals requiring the preparation of an impact statement: (1)
when was an action considered "major," (2) what actions were
"federal," (3) what environmental impacts were "significant," and
(4) what constituted "the human environment. 7 6
The leading decision on the meaning of the term "major" was
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (MPIRG) v. Butz. 77 In
MPIRG, the Forest Service argued that NEPA established a bifur-
cated test requiring that two conditions be satisfied before an im-
pact statement was mandated. First, the action had to be major,
and second, the environmental impacts had to be significant. 78 The
Eighth Circuit, however, summarily rejected this approach and re-
fused to "separate the consideration of the magnitude of federal
action from its impact on the environment. ' 79 Adopting such a for-
malistic approach would be inconsistent with "the purposes of the
Act" and would create the anomolous category of "minor federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment" for which no statement would be prepared." To avoid this
result, the MPIRG court concluded that "the activities of federal
agencies cannot be isolated from their impact on the environment"
and that agencies had to provide "the detailed consideration [of
environmental impacts] mandated by NEPA" when any action has
"a significant effect" on the environment.8
Arguments that NEPA was inapplicable because an action was
not "federal" arose in two contexts. One set of cases involved situ-
ations where the primary actor was a private individual or a pri-
vate business concern, but the private actor had to secure federal
approval before undertaking the action. The second group of cases
involved projects where the primary actor was a state or local gov-
jernment but the federal government participated in a significant
way, usually by providing a substantial portion of the project's
funding. In both types of cases, the trend of the NEPA decisions
pointed in the same direction: NEPA applied whenever a federal
agency participated in a significant way.
In the cases involving private actors, the courts generally re-
quired the preparation of an impact statement whenever the gov-
76. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
77. 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
78. Id. at 1321.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1321-22.
81. Id. at 1322.
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ernment authorized a project that would have required a statement
if the government had tried to undertake the project itself. The
decisions seemed to pay little attention to whether an action was
labelled a permit, license, or lease, or received some other designa-
tion. If a federal agency had significant discretion to allow or re-
fuse to allow the private actor to proceed, the agency had to pre-
pare a statement before exercising its discretion. 2 If no agency had
authority to control the private activity, then no statement was
required.8 3
The courts used a similarly pragmatic approach for projects in-
volving federal cooperation with state and local authorities. Al-
though agencies did not have to prepare impact statements for
state or local projects over which they had no control,"4 courts did
require the preparation of impact statements when federal agen-
cies played a significant role in a project or had discretion as to
whether to fund a project.85  Furthermore, courts re-
fused-especially in highway construction cases-to allow state
and local governments to avoid environmental scrutiny by funding
the controversial portions of joint projects with nonfederal funds.8"
82. E.g., id. (extensions and modifications to contracts allowing the cutting of timber on
federal lands); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) (approval of a ninety-nine
year lease on an Indian reservation); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,
458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (leases for offshore oil exploration by private companies);
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972) (reviewing NEPA rules that apply in
licensing proceedings for construction and operation of nuclear power plants by private
companies).
83. See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 763 (1977) ("Without attempt-
ing to explain or reconcile all the cases, the distinguishing feature of federal involvement is
the ability to influence or control the outcome in material respects. The [impact statement]
process is supposed to inform the decision-maker. This presupposes he had judgment to
exercise. Cases finding federal action emphasize authority to exercise discretion over the
outcome.").
84. E.g., Bradford Township v. Illinois Toll Highway Auth., 463 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1972);
Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244 (N.D.N.C. 1975); O'Brien v. Brinegar, 379 F.
Supp. 289 (D. Minn. 1974); cf. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776
(1976) (no duty to prepare an impact statement on a disclosure statement where the federal
official lacked authority to take any action even if adverse environmental consequences were
shown).
85. E.g., Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973) (amendments to urban renewal con-
tracts); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (construction grant for medical facility at
state prison).
86. E.g., Ecology Center of La., Inc. v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975); Named
Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d
1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); James River & Kanawha Canal
Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1973); Indian
Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir.
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The early NEPA cases were less successful in defining the term
"significantly" so as to narrow agency discretion with regard to the
threshold determination. The Court in Hanly expressed confidence
that "the meaning of the term 'significantly'. . . can be isolated as
a question of law" and proceeded to offer the following test for
determining when environmental impacts are significant:
[I]n deciding whether a major federal action will "significantly" af-
fect the quality of the human environment the agency in charge, al-
though vested with broad discretion, should normally be required to
review the proposed action in light of at least two relevant factors:
(1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental
effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the area affected
by it, and (2) the absolute quantative effects of the action itself, in-
cluding the cumulative harm that results from its contribution to
existing adverse conditions or uses in the areaY
Although widely followed,8  the Hanly test (especially the itali-
cized language) did little to alter the factual nature of the signifi-
cance inquiry. As a result, cases involving disputes over the signifi-
cance of environmental harm formed the bulk of the cases where
courts tried to develop more stringent standards for reviewing
agency discretion."'
The final term defined by the courts was "human environment."
Here the dispute revolved around whether an impact statement
was required only when an action significantly affected natural re-
sources like land, air, or water or whether it also applied when the
significant effects were socio-economic in nature. The government
advocated a narrow definition that provided little scope for judicial
1973). Congress later overruled the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y decision in the Fed-
eral-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 154, 87 Stat. 276. See Named Individual
Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975).
87. Hanly v. Kleindeinst, 471 F.2d 823, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1972) (emphasis added), cert. de-
nied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
88. E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1381 (7th Cir. 1973);
McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221, 250 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Union Mechling v. United
States, 390 F. Supp. 391, 411 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 15 (S.D.
Tex. 1974).
89. See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); MPIRG, 498 F.2d 1314; Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Coun-
cil v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th
Cir. 1973); Township of Ridley v. Blanchette, 421 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Friends of
Yosemite v. Frizzell, 420 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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review of the agency decision. The issue, however, tended to divide
commentators. Some argued for a broad "ecological" approach that
recognized social and economic impacts as part of the decisional
matrix;90 others expressed concern that such a broad and vague
definition of the term "environmental" would give agencies still
another excuse for giving short shrift to impacts on natural re-
sources or the physical environment. 91
The judges proved as ambivalent as the commentators. The sem-
inal case defining "human environment" was Hanly,92 which in-
volved the General Services Administration's proposal to construct
a metropolitan correction center as part of an annex to the United
States courthouse in Manhattan. On the one hand, the Second Cir-
cuit suggested, in dicta, that "[i]t is doubtful whether psychologi-
cal and sociological effects upon neighbors constitute the type of
factors that may be considered in making. . .[a threshold] deter-
mination since they do not lend themselves to measurement." 93 On
the other hand, the court did conclude that the agency was to con-
sider two issues with more social than physical impact: whether a
proposed community treatment program for drug addicts would
endanger the health and safety of persons in the area and whether
construction of the proposed facility would increase the risk of
crime in the area.94
Most other cases tended to give lessened scrutiny to socio-eco-
nomic impacts, but stopped short 6f holding that the effects were
outside NEPA's scope.95 A general resolution of the issue finally
90. E.g., Note, Socioeconomic Impacts and the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 64 GEo. L.J. 1120 (1976).
91. E.g., Peltz & Weinman, NEPA Threshold Determinations: A Framework of Analysis
31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 71, 116-17 (1976); cf. Anderson, The National Environmental Policy
Act, FED. ENVTL. L. 311-12 (Dolgin & Guilbert eds. 1974) ("[T]here is a danger that project
justification and economic and technical considerations will swallow up environmental im-
pact analysis if the scope of the statement [were] expanded" to require it to contain "the
full record documenting how costs and benefits were traded off.").
92. The Hanly litigation also challenged the failure to prepare an impact statement for an
office building, located in the same complex, to house the United States attorney and his
staff. Because that building did not involve the same threat of increased crime and adverse
health impacts on the public, the Second Circuit upheld the GSA determination that no
impact statement was required. Hanly, 471 F.2d 823.
93. Id. at 833, But cf. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1982) (NEPA provisions requiring federal
agencies to develop methods and procedures that "will insure that presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmak-
ing along with economic and technical considerations.").
94. Hanly, 471 F.2d at 832.
95. E.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
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emerged in a series of decisions rendered during the middle of the
decade. The cases that prompted the resolution concerned a com-
mon factual question-whether the socio-economic impacts associ-
ated with eliminating a military organization or reducing its size
required the preparation of an impact statement. With one signifi-
cant exception,96 the decisions reached a curious compromise. Al-
though the courts refused to define "human environment" so as to
exclude socio-economic impacts, they ruled that these impacts
would not require the preparation of an impact statement in cases
where the impact on the physical environment was not
"significant. ' 97
3. Exceptions
The early NEPA cases also reflected a judicial reluctance to
fashion exceptions exempting particular federal actions from the
impact statement process. As a result, the courts held that NEPA's
requirement that "all agencies" comply with the action-forcing
provisions "to the fullest extent possible" precluded exemptions
except when an agency's NEPA duties directly conflicted with an-
other statutory mandate.98 They also carved out an exemption for
the Environmental Protection Agency only when the agency's reg-
ulatory procedures provided "the functional equivalent of an im-
pact statement."99 Finally, they even applied the impact statement
requirement to projects begun before NEPA was enacted whenever
the remaining governmental action "would qualify independently
denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 516
F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United
States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
96. McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975). But cf. Metlakatla In-
dian Community v. Adams, 427 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1977) (arguing that McDowell could
be reconciled with other cases refusing to require impact statements).
97. See Image of San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1978); National Ass'n of
Governmental Employees v. Brown, 556 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld,
537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 1061 (1977); Metlakatla Indian Commu-
nity v. Adams, 427 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1977); National Ass'n of Governmental Employees
v. Rumsfield, 418 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
98. E.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the cases accepting and rejecting
the argument that only "substantial compliance" with NEPA was required, see also W.
RODGERS, supra note 83, at 764-65.
99. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). For a list of cases accepting the "functional equivalent" argu-
ment, see W. RODGERS, supra note 83, at 765 n.30.
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under the Act as a 'major federal action.' ,,100
C. The Duty to Consider Alternatives
Although section 102(2)(C) contained a number of action-forcing
provisions, the impact statement was the most specific and thus
the most amenable to judicial enforcement. Nonetheless, several
decisions held that a second requirement, the direction to "study,
develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved con-
flicts concerning alternate uses of available resources,' 0'1 also im-
posed judicially enforceable obligations.
A Fifth Circuit decision concluded that this duty to "study, de-
velop, and describe alternatives" imposed more stringent obliga-
tions than the mandate that impact statements discuss "alterna-
tives to the proposed action." According to Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
(Tennessee- Tombigbee Waterway),0 2 the separate requirement to
study, describe, and develop alternatives was "supplemental to and
more extensive in its commands" than the duty imposed by section
102(2)(C) to consider alternatives in an impact statement. Its pur-
pose was "to emphasize that no major federal project should be
undertaken without intense consideration of other more ecologi-
cally sound courses of action," including those that were beyond
the proposing agency's powers to implement.10 3
The Second Circuit extended the Tennessee-Tombigbee analysis
to hold that NEPA required federal agencies to study, develop,
and describe alternatives in some cases where the agency was not
required to prepare an impact statement. The court noted in Trin-
ity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney'" that the alternatives
mandate applied to "any proposal which involves unresolved con-
flicts concerning alternative uses of available resources," not just to
100. W. RODGERS, supra note 83, at 766. See generally Note, Retroactive Application of
the National Environmental Policy Act, 69 MICH. L. REv. 732 (1972); Note, Retroactive
Application of the National Environmental Policy Act, 39 TENN. L. REV. 735 (1972).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1982). This subparagraph was § 102(2)(D) of NEPA as origi-
nally enacted. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
102. 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
103. Id. at 1135.
104. 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975), on remand sub nom. Trinity Episcopal Schools Corp. v.
Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom., Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.




those that had a significant impact on the quality of the human
environment. 0 ' Without attempting to define the "outer limits" of
this language, the court affirmed that the alternatives analysis was
required whenever "the objective of a major federal project can be
achieved in one of two or more ways that will have differing im-
pacts on the environment.' 10 6 Applying that standard to the case
before it, the Second Circuit ruled that the Department of Housing
and Urban Development had to prepare an alternatives analysis
for a proposed change in an urban redevelopment plan even
though the change did not require the preparation of an impact
statement. 0
D. Impact Statements
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the courts quickly demon-
strated their willingness to review the threshold determination of
whether an environmental impact statement had to be prepared.
As a result, agencies began to acknowledge their duty to prepare
the statements, 08 and opponents of proposed agency actions began
to question agency compliance with the statute's requirements.
Three types of issues appeared in the cases: when must impact
statements be prepared; who must prepare them; and what must
they include.
1. When Must an Impact Statement be Prepared?
For many development projects, the courts made little effort to
specify when the statement had to be prepared, except to require
its preparation before the federal government began construction
or made an irrevocable commitment to the project. If the govern-
ment tried to begin a "major federal action," such as building a
highway or constructing a dam without preparing a statement,
courts regularly enjoined agencies from proceeding with the project
until it complied with NEPA's procedural requirements. 0 9 More-
over, compliance was required even in situations where intuition
suggested that the environmental analysis might amount to a post
105. Trinity Episcopal, 523 F.2d at 93.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 95.
108. After preparing 319 draft statements in 1970, federal agencies prepared more than
1000 in each of the next five years. 1976 U.S. COUNCIL ON ENv'rL. QUALITY, SEVENTH ANN.
REP. ON ENVTL. QuALTy 132 (Table 1-33) [hereinafter cited as 1976 U.S. COUNCIL].
109. See W. RODGERS, supra note 83, at 799-801.
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hoc rationalization for the project.'" Perhaps courts believed that
procedural compliance was necessary to preserve the "integrity" of
the statutory scheme' or that the availability of the injunctive
remedy would encourage agencies to prepare statements earlier in
future projects. Or maybe they believed that careful scrutiny of the
statement itself"' and of the merits of the agency's decision"'
would enable them to set aside such rationalizations in subsequent
litigation. At any rate, the prohibitory injunction quickly became
the standard remedy for forcing agencies to prepare statements
before they began development projects.
However, the prohibitory injunction seemed especially inade-
quate in two types of cases: grants programs (such as the Federal
Highway Act) where the federal funding commitment was reached
long after the basic design and location decisions had been made,
and research programs (like the liquid fast breeder reactor pro-
gram) that involved substantial expenditures before the federal
government committed itself to the development of the technology.
In both cases, postponing the environmental analysis until the
time for the final federal decision could seriously bias the decision
by discouraging alternate designs or locations, or by advancing the
research technology to a point that gave it a clear advantage over
alternative technologies. Although the courts occasionally tried to
force granting agencies to consider the broader design and location
issues," 4 the case that directly addressed the timing issue involved
the research problem.
The plaintiffs in Scientists' Institute for Public Information
(SIPI) v. Atomic Energy Commission"5 challenged the AEC's fail-
ure to prepare an impact statement with respect to its research
and development program for a liquid fast breeder reactor to be
used in nuclear power plants."' Although the AEC conceded that
constructing and operating its test facilities for the program would
require preparation of impact statements for the various facili-
110. Id. at 738.
111. See City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
112. For a discussion on the review of the adequacy of impact statements, see infra text
accompanying notes 145-56.
113. For a discussion of the cases that did review the substance of agency decisions, see
infra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
114. E.g., Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1974), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd on remand, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976).
115. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
116. Id. at 1082-84 (describing the fast breeder technology).
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ties,117 it argued that the impact statement requirement did not
apply to research and development projects and that, in any event,
the uncertain prospects of breeder technology made the prepara-
tion of a statement premature.
Judge Wright authored the SIPI opinion, and he gave the AEC's
decision the same strict scrutiny he had advocated in Calvert
Cliffs'."' In his view, the agency's attempt to exclude research and
development programs from the statement requirement rested on
an "unnecessarily crabbed approach" to the statute.1 9 He con-
cluded that there were two grounds upon which to require state-
ments for on-going research efforts like the breeder reactor pro-
gram. First, because of the AEC's annual appropriation requests,
such a project amounted to a "proposal for legislation."' 20 Second,
since technology development programs involved "federal" actions
and the environmental impacts of the breeder program were signif-
icant, the breeder program was a "major federal action signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment.' 21
The question of "[w]hether a statement on the overall [breeder]
program should be issued now or at some uncertain date in the
future" was a more difficult one for the court. The underlying pol-
icy of NEPA favoring meaningful and timely information on the
effects of agency action pulled the court in conflicting directions:
"[s]tatements must be written late enough in the development pro-
cess to contain meaningful information, but they must [also] be
written early enough so that whatever information is contained can
practically serve as an input into the decision making process.' 22
To solve that dilemma, the court identified four factors as relevant
in deciding when a statement was required: (1) the likelihood that
the technology would reach commercial feasibility in the near fu-
ture; (2) the availability of meaningful information on the effects
of application of the technology; (3) the extent to which the devel-
opment of the technology causes irretrievable commitments and
precludes the pursuit of alternatives; and (4) the severity of the
environmental effects if the technology proves commercially feasi-
117. Id. at 1085.
118. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
119. SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1086-87.
120. Id. at 1088. The Supreme Court later rejected the argument that appropriation re-
quests were "proposals for legislation." Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979); see infra
notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
121. SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1088-89.
122. Id. at 1094.
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ble. 23 Because each of these factors indicated that the time for an
impact statement on the breeder program had arrived, 2 4 the court
entered a declaratory judgment holding that NEPA required the
AEC to prepare an impact statement on the program.2 5
Subsequent decisions served to clarify the relationship of the
"programmatic" statements required by SIPI to the specific
projects that formed the bulk of NEPA litigation. These cases em-
phasized that preparation of the programmatic statement did not
always eliminate the responsibility to prepare additional state-
ments on individual projects in the program. If the individual
projects would have significant impacts not considered in the
programmatic statement, the agency also had to prepare additional
"site-specific" statements covering those projects. 26
2. Who Must Prepare the Statements?
Section 102(2)(C) directs the "responsible official" to prepare the
"detailed statement" required for "proposals for . . major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment." This requirement presents relatively few problems with re-
spect to the government's own projects, but it raises difficulties
when the government authorizes private action or funds state or
local actions. In those cases, the government frequently prefered to
have the applicant for the permit or grant prepare the environ-
mental analysis, while environmental plaintiffs argued that section
102(2)(C) mandates that the agency itself prepare the statement.
The most stringent restrictions on the federal government's
power to delegate preparation of the impact statement to private
groups or to state or local governments came in a series of deci-
sions rendered by the Second Circuit. The first of these decisions
was Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission
(FPC).117 In Greene County, the court of appeals invalidated an
123. Id. Three years later, the Supreme Court reversed Judge Wright's attempt to apply
this four-part test where the agency "anticipated" a proposal for a major federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. See Kleppe v. South Carolina,
427 U.S. 390 (1976); infra notes 223-35 and accompanying text.
124. SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1095 n.68.
125. The plaintiffs in SIPI did not seek to enjoin continued research and development
work pending completion of the statement. Id. at 1082 n.1; see W. RODGERS, supra note 83,
at 791.
126. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829
(D.D.C. 1974), afl'd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
127. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1972).
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FPC rule that required all applicants for permits involving con-
struction of "major projects" to prepare the impact statements
needed to satisfy NEPA. 12 8 According to the Second Circuit,
NEPA required the FPC staff to prepare its own impact statement
before holding hearings on an application for a permit.129 To guide
the agency in revising its rules, the court cited with approval the
rules the AEC had adopted following the remand in Calvert
Cliffs. 1 30 Those rules, the court noted, not only required "an appli-
cant to submit its environmental report," but they also obligated
the agency to prepare the "final detailed statement, which is of-
fered in evidence at a contested hearing."1 31
Nearly three years later, the Second Circuit expanded its Greene
County holding to encompass governmental applications for fed-
eral grants. In Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v.
Secretary of Transportation,132 the appellate court ruled that the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) could not satisfy NEPA
by requiring the state agency seeking funds to prepare the impact
statement. Quoting the holding in Greene County, the court ex-
plained that state agencies are "established to pursue state goals"
that may not parallel the federal commitment to environmental
protection; therefore, "[t]ransposing the federal duty to prepare
the [statement] is . . . unlikely to result in as dispassionate an ap-
praisal of environmental considerations as the federal agency itself
could produce.' 33 To the contrary, the best method for obtaining
"an objective, comprehensive" statement was to require "strict ad-
herence" to the Greene County rule in the highway-grant
context. 3 1
Not all decisions applied the "responsible official" requirement
so strictly. Indeed, some were quite tolerant of agency delegation
of these responsibilities. Perhaps the most tolerant was the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Life of the Land v. Brinegar.135 Life of the
128. The FPC regulation required the commission staff to prepare its own statement in
uncontested cases, but not in contested cases. Greene County, 455 F.2d at 416-17. Because
Greene County was a contested case, the staff had not prepared an impact statement.
129. Id. at 422.
130. Id. (citing 36 Fed. Reg. 18,071 (1971)).
131. Greene County, 455 F.2d at 422.
132. 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd on remand, 531 F.2d
637 (2d Cir. 1976).
133. Id. at 931.
134. Id. at 932.
135. 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cert." denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974). See also Movement
Against Destruction v. Volpe, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974); Iowa Citizens for Envtl. Quality,
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Land involved a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) grant to
help finance the construction of a new runway for Honolulu Inter-
national Airport, a project that the FAA recognized as requiring
the preparation of an impact statement. According to the Ninth
Circuit, the impact statement was a group effort. A "team" of "fed-
eral and state officials, and employees of. . .a private consulting
company" all participated in the writing of the initial draft. This
team also prepared the final statement that was approved by the
Assistant Secretary for Environment and Urban Systems in the
Department of Transportation.'36
The plaintiffs objected to the participation of the consulting
firm's employees in the preparation of the statement. The plaintiff
argued that because the consulting firm had also been awarded a
management contract to supervise construction of the runway, al-
lowing its employees to help prepare the impact statement
amounted to an impermissible delegation of responsibility for the
statement to a private firm with "a major and direct contingent
financial interest in the . ..construction [of the runway].' 31
The Ninth Circuit unequivocally rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment. Acknowledging that the record showed that the consulting
firm "had a financial interest in an affirmative decision on the pro-
posed project,"'1 8 the court did not believe that this fact disquali-
fied its employees from assisting in the preparation of the impact
statement. In the Ninth Circuit's view, "nothing. . .in either the
wording of NEPA or the case law. . . indicates that, as a matter of
law, a firm with a financial interest in [a] project may not assist
with the drafting of the [statement]." All that NEPA mandated
was that "the applicable federal agency must bear the responsibil-
ity for the ultimate work product designed to satisfy the require-
ment of section 102(2)(C)." The FAA had satisfied that require-
ment because the record demonstrated that FAA officials "actively
participated in all phases of the [statement] preparation
process."' 39
Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973); Citizens Envtl. Council v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 870
(10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc.
v. Brinegar, 484 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1973).
136. Life of the Land, 485 F.2d at 466-67. The FAA conceded that it bore the ultimate
responsibility for the statement. Id. at 467.





It is possible to reconcile Life of the Land with the Second Cir-
cuit decisions by arguing that the distinction was factual rather
than conceptual; that is, by emphasizing the Ninth Circuit's find-
ings concerning the adequacy of the FAA's contribution to the
statement and of its oversight of the nonfederal party's contribu-
tion to the impact statement.14 0 However, the FHWA was unwill-
ing to rely on its ability to persuade either the Supreme Court or
the Second Circuit and its sister tribunals to limit the Greene
County-Conservation Society rule, and it quickly persuaded Con-
gress to amend NEPA to permit state highway departments to pre-
pare draft impact statements. 4 ' Although the amendment granted
the FHWA the specific relief it sought, it still required the FHWA
officials to participate in the preparation of the statement, to eval-
uate the statement "independently," and to assume responsibility
for the statement's "scope, objectivity, and content." Moreover, in
an apparent attempt to limit the amendment to highway cases,4 2
the amendment only applied when the agency preparing the state-
ment had statewide responsibilities for the type of project that the
federal government was supporting through its grant program.
Most other agencies seemed relatively untroubled by the delega-
tion cases. They accommodated themselves to the Greene County-
Conservation Society-Life of the Land line of decisions by assum-
ing responsibility (using either governmental employees or consul-
tants with no direct financial interest in the proposal 4 3) to prepare
impact statements. They did, however, frequently require permit
and grant applicants to supply the ecological and other data that
would be used in preparing the statements. 4 4
140. Life of the Land distinguished the cases in this way: "Unlike . . . [Green County
and Conservation Society of Southern Vermont], the federal agency here involved did not
abdicate a significant part of its responsibility to another organization." Id. at 468 (citations
omitted).
141. Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 244 (1975). See generally 1977 U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL.
QUALITY, SIXTH ANN. REP. ON ENVTL. QUALITY 647-49; W. RODGERS, supra note 83, at 781-82.
142. See S. REP. No. 152, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975). According to the Senate Report,
the proposed statute "would establish a single, uniform procedure for [impact statement]
preparation in a very limited number of Federal programs most analogous to, and including,
the Federal-aid highway program." Id. at 9.
143. Even the Second Circuit permitted agencies to use consultants who did not have a
financial interest in the project. See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,
524 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 1975).
144. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 51.20 (1976) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 18 C.F.R. § 2.81
(Federal Power Commission); cf. 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.410(e)(7)-.410(e)(8) (allowing the corps of
engineers to consider environmental submissions of nonfederal applicants for permits).
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3. What Must the Statement Include?
The third, and most fundamental, problem regarding impact
statements was the determination of whether a statement satisfied
the statute's requirement of a "detailed statement" analyzing the
environmental consequences of the proposal. NEPA provided little
guidance on what had to be included; it simply directed that the
statement address each of five fairly general topics. 14 5 Far fewer
early cases dealt with the question of statement "adequacy" than
dealt with the threshold question of whether an impact statement
had to be prepared.146 But the federal courts reaching the ade-
quacy issue proved willing to add substance to the rather vague
statutory provision that Congress had enacted.
As was true with the threshold decisions not to prepare a state-
ment, one of the first issues courts reviewing the adequacy of state-
ments had to face was specifying the applicable standard of review.
The reported decisions reached a result that paralleled the one
taken in the threshold cases. Searching for an intermediate level of
review between the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard
and the standard of de novo review, most courts settled on a stan-
dard of "reasonableness." This standard required the courts to
take a "hard look" at whether the agency had made a good faith
effort to cover the statutory topics."'
The cases reaching the adequacy issue tended to focus on two of
the topics enumerated in the statute: the duty to analyze the envi-
ronmental impacts of the proposed action and the responsibility to
discuss alternatives to the proposed action. With respect to both
topics, courts tried to force agencies to make the statement a "full
disclosure" document1 48 that could form the basis for rational
145. See supra text accompanying note 25.
146. The reason for this focus in the early cases is obvious. There were relatively few
impact statements prepared in NEPA's first year. For a summary of the statements agencies
prepared during the first half of the 1970's, see 1976 U.S. CoUNcIL, supra note 108, at 132
(Table 1-33).
147. See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1001-03 (10th Cir. 1973);
Environmental Defense Fund v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 296 (8th
Cir. 1972) (Gilham Dam); Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
148. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS, supra note 6, at 201 (citing Sierra Club v. Fro-
ehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (Trinity River-Wallisville Dam), rev'd, 449 F.2d
982 (5th Cir. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 339 F. Supp.
806 (E.D. Tenn.) (Tellico Dam), afl'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Conservation Council




An early case that emphasized the need for the statement to an-
alyze environmental impacts was Committee for Nuclear Respon-
sibility, Inc. v. Seaborg.149 Seaborg reversed a district court order
granting the AEC summary judgment regarding to the adequacy of
the statement it had prepared on a proposal to conduct an under-
ground nuclear test. The plaintiffs offered to establish that the
statement omitted "responsible scientific opinion" on the environ-
mental consequences of the proposed test, and the court of appeals
held that this offer was sufficient to raise a disputed issue of mate-
rial fact rendering the entry of summary judgment improper.
In explaining the basis for its ruling, the court disavowed any
judicial authority "to rule on the relative merits of competing sci-
entific opinion." Instead, the judicial duty was to ensure that state-
ments included "opposing scientific views" and that agencies did
not "take the arbitrary and impermissible approach of completely
omitting from the statement. . . any reference whatever to the ex-
istence of responsible scientific opinions concerning possible ad-
verse environmental effects."'1 0 The court conceded that the
preparers of the statements had "discretion" to exclude opinions
that did not qualify as "responsible opposing views," but held that
the exercise of that discretion was subject to judicial review.15'
Thus, it was improper to grant summary judgment before giving
the plaintiffs the opportunity to prove that the agency had ex-
ceeded its discretion.
The leading case explaining the need for a statement to discuss
"alternatives to the proposed action" was Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Morton.12 The case involved a challenge to
the adequacy of an impact statement prepared by the Interior De-
partment with respect to its proposal to grant oil and gas leases for
off-shore lands in the Gulf of Mexico. All parties conceded that the
department had accurately described the environmental impacts of
the proposals. 5 3 The plaintiffs, however, argued that the statement
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Wis. 1972) (Kickapoo River); Allison v.
Froehlke, 2 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTn. L. INST.) 20,357 (W.D. Tex.), af'd, 470 F.2d 1123 (5th
Cir. 1972); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972).
149. 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
150. Id. at 787.
151. Id. (emphasis in original).
152. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
153. Id. at 833.
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did not satisfy NEPA's requirements because it failed to discuss
various alternative ways to satisfy the energy needs that had
prompted the proposal for off-shore leasing.
Before considering the particular alternatives suggested by the
plaintiffs, the court broadly defined the purposes that Congress
"contemplated" impact statements would serve. According to the
court, Congress intended for the statement to do more than guide
the official who was responsible for its preparation. The statement
also was to "constitute the environmental source material for the
information of Congress as well as the Executive, in connection
with the making of relevant decisions, and would be available to
enhance enlightenment of-and by-the public." '154
Analysis of the Interior Department's statement in light of this
congressional purpose led the court to conclude that it did not sat-
isfy NEPA's requirement to discuss alternatives. The most signifi-
cant omission was the failure to discuss the alternative of eliminat-
ing oil import quotas. The Department defended this omission on
the grounds that its Secretary lacked the power to implement the
alternative and that a statement did not have to address any alter-
natives that were beyond the proposing agency's powers to adopt
or put into effect. The court unequivocally rejected this analysis.
Instead, it insisted that the range of alternatives the statement had
to discuss was as broad as the problem it was attempting to re-
dress. The court concluded that the statement was to guide "Con-
gress and the President, to whom [it] goes" as well as to explain
"the thinking of the agency that prepared it." As a result, the
statement had to address all reasonable alternatives, such as the
elimination of import quotas, that fell within the purview of "these
ultimate decision makers.' 1 55
In applying this analysis to the other alternatives suggested by
the plaintiffs, the court emphasized that the statement only had to
address those suggestions that were reasonable alternatives to the
need for energy through the mid-1970's. On the basis of this crite-
rion, the court upheld the agency's failure to discuss development
of oil shale, desulfurization of coal, coal liquefaction and gasifica-
tion, tar sands, and geothermal resources. As for various other al-
ternatives that would require congressional action to implement,
the court merely announced the following rule of reasonableness
154. Id.
155. Id. at 835.
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without explaining how it would apply to the suggested
alternatives:
The mere fact that an alternative requires legislative implementa-
tion does not automatically establish it as beyond the domain of
what is required for discussion, particularly since NEPA was in-
tended to provide a basis for consideration and choice by the deci-
sionmakers in the legislative as well as the executive branch. But the
need for an overhaul of basic legislation certainly bears on the re-
quirement of the Act. We do not suppose Congress intended an
agency to devote itself to extended discussion of the environmental
impact of alternatives so remote from reality as to depend on, say,
the repeal of the antitrust laws.'56
E. Review of Substantive Decisions
The ultimate aim of NEPA was neither to assure the prepara-
tion of impact statements nor to guarantee the high quality of
statements that were prepared. It was to change the substantive
decisions made by federal agencies, to induce them to reach deci-
sions less harmful to the environment than what would have been
reached without NEPA. NEPA cases did consider the extent to
which courts would enforce this ultimate or substantive goal of
NEPA, but the answer they gave was equivocal. The courts gener-
ally found substantive decisions reviewable, but they normally ap-
plied the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard in review-
ing specific agency decisions. Nonetheless, the issue remained
unsettled, and environmentalists continued to argue for stricter
scrutiny of these substantive decisions.
Like many other NEPA issues, dicta in Calvert Cliffs' provided
the basic framework of analysis for substantive review. In his over-
view of the statute's requirements, Judge Wright had emphasized
that NEPA's substantive duties were more flexible than its proce-
dural requirements.151 Moreover, he had suggested that courts
could probably rely on NEPA to reverse substantive decisions only
when "the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was
arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental
values.' 15
156. Id. at 837.
157. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
158. Id. at 1115.
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Although some decisions indicated that NEPA authorized no
substantive review at all,159 most followed the Calvert Cliffs' dicta.
The cases claimed a power to review agency decisions but adopted
a deferential standard that invariably sustained the agency's deter-
mination.160 Perhaps the best illustration of this combination of
formal review authority and practical impotence is the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers of the United States Army (Gilham Dam).'s' Both
NEPA's language and its legislative history convinced the appel-
late court that the statute was designed "to effect substantive
changes in decision making" and led it to conclude that the district
judge had erred in failing to recognize that NEPA imposed sub-
stantive obligations that were subject to judicial review. Nonethe-
less, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the
Corps of Engineers. According to the Eighth Circuit, NEPA per-
mitted a court to overturn substantive decisions only when an
agency failed to make "a full, good faith consideration and balanc-
ing of the environmental factors" or when the balance the agency
struck "was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environ-
mental values."' 62 Applying this deferential standard, the Eighth
Circuit was unwilling to set aside the Corps' decision. In view of
the advanced stage of the project when NEPA was passed, 6 ' the
decision of the Corps of Engineers' was defensible, even though the
official in charge of preparing the impact statement had assured
local civic leaders that the dam would be built while the statement
was being prepared.16 4
159. E.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971); Conserva-
tion Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd, 473 F.2d 664 (4th
Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F.
Supp. 749, 755 (E.D. Ark. 1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
931 (1973).
160. E.g., Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463, 468-69 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash.
1972), afi'd, 487 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1973); Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn.
1972).
161. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
162. Id. at 300.
163. "[T]he overall project was authorized by Congress eleven years prior to the passage
of NEPA, and was sixty-three percent completed at the date this action was instituted." Id.
at 301.
164. "Colonel Vernon W. Pickney, District Engineer in charge of preparing the [impact
statement] until his retirement, [spoke] before a local Chamber of Commerce meeting, as-
suring his listeners that the Gillham Dam would definitely be built." Id. at 295.
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Environmentalists welcomed the two-pronged test of Gilham
Dam, but they objected to the Eighth Circuit's application of it
and argued that it did not exhaust NEPA's substantive require-
ments. Their arguments frequently relied on Citizens To Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,'6 5 in which the Supreme Court inter-
preted the Department of Transportation Act as a strict limitation
on the federal government's ability to fund highways that cross
publicly owned park land. Environmentalists suggested that vari-
ous phrases in section 101 of NEPA were susceptible to a similarly
restrictive reading. For example, environmentalists suggested that
the direction to "use all practical means" to achieve NEPA's goals
could be read to require federal agencies to mitigate environmental
harm whenever feasible. Furthermore, the references to "each gen-
eration as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations"
could incorporate the public trust doctrine that had formed the
basis for state law decisions protecting the environment.1 6 Even
though environmentalists did not prevail on these arguments, they
remained hopeful that courts might eventually scrutinize substan-
tive decisions as carefully as the courts had come to scrutinize
threshold determinations and impact statements.
III. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS OF NEPA
When those who had advocated greater sensitivity to environ-
mental values paused to assess NEPA in the mid-1970's, most of
their appraisals were positive, but not euphoric. 16 7 For example,
when Frederick Anderson, the director of the Environmental Law
Institute, carefully analyzed NEPA's judicial history in 1973168 and
its institutional implementation a year later, 69 he lauded NEPA's
accomplishments while cautioning that much remained to be done.
In his book, NEPA in the Courts, Anderson praised the early judi-
cial decisions for establishing "NEPA's potential for lasting reform
165. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See infra note 306 (summary of the Overton Park holding with
respect to substantive review).
166. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS, supra note 6, at 258-71; W. RODGERS, supra
note 83, at 738-50. See generally Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Sub-
.rtantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HARV. L. REv. 735 (1975).
167. In addition to the commentators cited in the text, see 1977 U.S. CouNcIL, supra note
141, at 626-40; R. ANDREWS, supra note 6, at 143-63; Friesema and Culhane, Social Impacts,
Politics, and the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 339
(1976); Symposium, Implementing NEPA's Substantive Goals, 6 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 50,001 (1976).
168. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS, supra note 6.
169. Anderson, supra note 91, at 73.
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of federal government," but he also noted that analysis of the deci-
sions shed "little light on the actual difference, if any, that NEPA
is making in the final decisions of the federal agencies and in the
quality of the environment."' 170 A year later, Anderson authored an
institutional analysis of NEPA, and offered definite, but re-
strained, praise for NEPA's accomplishments. He declared that
NEPA had produced "progress in reforming the bureaucratic
processes that neglect environmental values," but he hastened to
add that this progress still fell "short of the fundamental adminis-
trative revolution that the Act contemplates." In particular, he
found more progress in procedural compliance than in substantive
agency decisions.' 7 '
When Professor Rodgers published his environmental law trea-
tise in 1977, he offered a more positive assessment of NEPA. 172 It
was, he asserted, "the Sherman Act of environmental law," an "en-
actment that introduces federal courts to environmental questions
comprehensively for the first time, expands the scope of judicial
review of administrative action, injects new discipline and values
into administrative decision-making, and strengthens the hand of
Congress in overseeing agency actions with adverse environmental
effects.' 73 Despite these accomplishments, he acknowledged that
NEPA could still be dismissed as "a paper tiger;" like all "signifi-
cant legislation," it fell "short of its supporters' fondest aims. 74
Not all appraisals of NEPA were so favorable. Perhaps the most
notable of the nay-sayers was Professor Joseph Sax of the Univer-
sity of Michigan.'75 Based on his experience in opposing airport
expansion projects, 76 he concluded that NEPA was largely a fail-
ure that produced "little except fodder for law review writers and
contracts for that newest of growth industries, environmental con-
170. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS, supra note 6, at vii-ix.
171. Anderson, supra note 91, at 410.
172. W. RODGERS, supra note 83.
173. Id. at 697.
174. Id.
175. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973). Professor
Sax was an architect of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. COMIP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1983-84). The Michigan statute created substan-
tive protections for the environment and allowed citizens' suits as a primary means of en-
forcement. For an early assessment of the effectiveness of this approach, see Sax & Conner,
Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REV.
1004 (1972).
176. One of the projects that prompted the Life of the Land litigation was the expansion
of the Honolulu Airport. See supra text accompanying notes 135-39.
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sulting."'177 In his view, significant environmental reform required
more than laws requiring governments to study environmental con-
sequences before acting. To be effective, laws had to change "be-
havioral realities" by making environmentally preferable actions as
easy to implement and as certain to receive adequate financing as
alternatives that cause greater damage to the environment. Since
NEPA did neither, it would "not lead to significant self-reform by
agencies.' '1 78
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE CODIFICATION OF THE EARLY DECISIONS
In the last half of the 1970's, increased administrative review of
NEPA decisions served to reinforce the rules reflected in the early
judicial opinions described in the preceding section. The Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was the agency primarily respon-
sible for the new administrative oversight, and the chief vehicle for
oversight was the CEQ's adoption of regulations, made binding on
all federal agencies by executive order.
Title II of NEPA had created the CEQ as an advisory body in
the office of the President.179 Shortly after it was organized, the
CEQ promulgated a set of guidelines to aid other federal agencies
in complying with their duties regarding the preparation of impact
statements.'80 Although agencies and courts frequently followed
these guidelines in interpreting NEPA,' 8' their scope was lim-
ited, 182  and they were advisory rather than mandatory in
character.'8 3
177. Sax, supra note 175, at 248.
178. Id. at 245.
179. See supra note 19.
180. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970). The CEQ amended the guidelines in 1971, 36 Fed. Reg.
7724 (1971), and again in 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 (1973). See generally Liroff, The Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality, 3 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INsT.) 50,051 (1973).
181. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1974); Scien-
tists' Inst. for Pub. Information v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079,
1090 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (SIPI). But see Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir. 1972) (NEPA guidelines, though influential, are none-
theless "merely advisory").
182. The guidelines only addressed the preparation of impact statements. However, they
grew "more elaborate and sophisticated" with each revision: "The first guidelines, issued in
April 1970 as interim guidelines, were eight pages long. The second set, released in April
1971, increased in length to eighteen pages. By the third revision of August 1973, the guide-
lines had evolved to a length of approximately sixty-five printed pages." N. ORLOGG & G.
BROOKS, supra note 19, at 42.
183. Id. The authors asserted that
[tihe Executive Order designated the CEQ directives "guidelines," a term that does
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In 1977, President Carter issued an executive order giving the
CEQ authority to establish NEPA regulations that all federal
agencies were obligated to follow. 184 After holding public hearings,
polling federal agencies, and publishing a draft set of regulations,
the CEQ issued its final regulations on November 29, 1978, and
made them effective on July 30, 1979.185 Three aspects of the new
regulations were important. First, they tried to streamline and im-
prove NEPA compliance. Second, they codified most of the sub-
stantive rules that had evolved in the early litigation described
above. Third, they enhanced the CEQ's role as an overseer of
NEPA compliance.
In streamlining and improving NEPA compliance, the CEQ reg-
ulations attempted to respond both to the complaints of federal
agencies and their supporters that NEPA was unreasonably delay-
ing federal actions, and the complaints of environmentalists that
NEPA compliance frequently amounted to a paper-shuffling exer-
cise that did not affect actual decisions. To reduce delays and
paperwork,8 6 the regulations limited the length of impact state-
ments' 7 allowed agencies to reuse impact statements when later
actions raised issues that had previously been considered, 88 and
permitted agencies to identify categories of action as exempt from
impact statement requirements." 9 Much of the effort to encourage
greater use of statements in agency decision making was hortatory
in nature, 90 but two new requirements did appear. The regulations
directed agencies to use a "scoping" process to identify significant
not have an accepted meaning in traditional legal theory. The directives were not
"regulations," nor were they promulgated under the rulemaking procedures of the
Administrative Procedures Act. Accordingly, courts were reluctant to accord them the
full status of law; and judicial interpretations of their authoritativeness varied sub-
stantially . . . . The agencies' responses to the guidelines were similarly mixed. Al-
though most agencies readily acquiesced in the Council's elaboration of NEPA's man-
dates, a few agencies recoiled at the additional requirements established by the
Council and declined to follow provisions in the guidelines.
184. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977).
185. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,990 (1978). See generally McDermott, Improving NEPA: New Regu-
lations of the Council on Environmental Quality, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89 (1975).
186. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4, 1500.5 (1983).
187. Id. § 1500.4(a). "The text of final environmental impact statements . . . shall nor-
mally be less than 150 pages and for proposals of unusual scope or complexity shall nor-
mally be less than 300 pages." Id. § 1502.7.
188. Id. §§ 1500.4(i), 1500.4(j), 1502.4(a), 1502.20, 1502.21.
189. Id. §§ 1500.4(p), 1507.3(b)(2)(ii), 1508.4.
190. E.g., id. § 1500.4(b) (preparing analytic, rather than encyclopedic, environmental im-
pact statements); id. § 1500.4(d) (writing environmental impact statements in plain lan-
guage); see also id. §§ 1500.4(f), 1500.4(k), 1500.5(a)-(c), (g), (i).
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environmental issues before beginning work on a statement,.9' and
they obligated agencies to explore ways in which environmental
harm could be mitigated if the proposed action were carried out.'92
On almost all substantive issues, the regulations adopted the po-
sitions reflected in the circuit court decisions summarized above.
The regulations adopted the requirement of Hanly 93 for an envi-
ronmental assessment of all actions that might have a significant
impact on the environment' and even mandated an administra-
tive "record of decision" to facilitate judicial review.195 They also
accepted the judicial definition of statutory terms like "major,"' 96
"federal,' 97 "significantly,"' 98  and "human environment,"' 199 as
well as the judicial construction of the obligation to consider alter-
natives as distinct from the impact statement obligation.200 With
respect to impact statements, the CEQ regulations followed SIPI
in establishing a requirement for programmatic statements20 ' and
post-SIPI decisions by recognizing that agencies might have to
supplement these programmatic statements with "site-specific"
statements for particular projects.0 2 They also accepted the fed-
eral agency's responsibility for the content of the statement,20 3 as
well as its duty to ensure the "scientific integrity" of the state-
ment20 4 and to consider all reasonable alternatives to the proposed
actions (including those beyond the control of the initial decision-
maker).20 5 Finally, the regulations emphasized that NEPA had a
substantive as well as a procedural character. The purpose of the
NEPA process was "to help public officials make decisions that are
based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take
actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment. 2 0
6
The regulations also gave the CEQ an enhanced role in ensuring
191. Id. § 1501.7.
192. Id. § 1505.3. See also id. at §8 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h), 1503.3(d), 1505.2(c), 1508.20.
193. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
194. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1983).
195. Id. §8 1505.3, 1506.1, 1508.13.
196. Id. § 1508.18.
197. Id.
198. Id. § 1508.27.
199. Id. § 1508.14.
200. Id. § 1507.2(d).
201. Id. § 1502.5.
202. Id. § 1508.28.
203. Id. § 1506.5.
204. Id. § 1502.24.
205. Id. § 1502.14.
206. Id. § 1500.1(c).
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that agencies complied with their NEPA obligations. The ex-
panded role included at least four new responsibilities: authority to
determine whether the implementing regulations of other agencies
complied with the CEQ regulations, 2 7 authority to designate the
"lead agency" when two or more agencies were involved in a pro-
posal;20 8 authority to refer disputes over the potential environmen-
tal impact of a project to the President for review,20 9 and authority
to exempt agencies from the regulatory requirements in emergency
situations.2 10 Assigning these responsibilities to the CEQ thus
granted general oversight of the NEPA compliance of development
agencies to an agency with a clear environmental mandate.
V. THE RETREAT FROM JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
Even before the CEQ began its regulatory codification of the
early circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court handed down the
first in a series of decisions that seemed to reflect a much more
deferential attitude toward the NEPA determinations of federal
agencies. Moreover, this deferential attitude persisted in decisions
rendered after adoption of the new regulations as the Court con-
sistently reversed circuit court decisions that had overturned
agency determinations. In response to the Supreme Court deci-
sions, circuit courts appear to have retreated from the close scru-
tiny characteristic of the early NEPA cases. The discussion below
briefly chronicles these developments.
A. The Supreme Court Decisions
1. The Early Counter Theme
The first Supreme Court opinion to consider the scope of the
new duties that NEPA imposed on federal agencies came in
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP)," where the Court held that NEPA did not abro-
gate the rule precluding temporary injunctions against general rate
increases granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
Two years later, a second decision involving SCRAP ruled that the
ICC had sufficiently complied with its NEPA duties before al-
207. Id. § 1507.3.
208. Id. § 1501.5(e).
209. Id. § 1504.3(f)(7).
210. Id. § 1506.11.
211. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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lowing the general rate surcharge to take effect.2 12 Although these
two decisions together could have been read as an endorsement of
a narrow interpretation of NEPA language "1 and a repudiation of
the careful scrutiny of agency compliance displayed in the circuit
court decisions, commentators did not generally treat them in that
fashion.
A number of reasons help to explain why the SCRAP decisions
were not viewed as a repudiation of the developing circuit court
law requiring careful scrutiny of agency decisions. First, the
SCRAP decisions did not represent total defeat for the environ-
mentalists; indeed, the first decision was an important expansion
of standing for environmental plaintiffs.1 4 Second, the cases in-
volved judicial review of a general rate increase for railroads, a
type of ICC decision that the Court had long treated very deferen-
tially. Third, the SCRAP cases were not ones in which environ-
mental issues had been completely ignored; the ICC had prepared
an impact statement analyzing the environmental issues raised by
the opponents of the increase. Fourth, the cases stood as lonely
exceptions during the first half of the 1970's to the general rule
that close judicial scrutiny of agency decisions was appropriate. In
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,21 the Supreme
Court itself had encouraged close judicial scrutiny of environmen-
tal challenges to development projects, 216 and the Court's denial of
certiorari in a number of leading circuit court decisions21 7 sug-
gested that it was not dissatisfied with the general trend of the
lower court decisions.
212. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
422 U.S. 289 (1975).
213. Id. at 320 (emphasizing that the duty to prepare an impact statement arises under
NEPA only when an agency has made "a proposal for federal action") (emphasis in
original).
214. See SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 683-90.
215. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See generally
W. ROGERS, supra note 83, at 18-20.
216. See Leventhall, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 509, 514 (1974) (describing the Overton Park hearing following the Supreme
Court's remand as an example of "the 'hard look' doctrine in spades").
217. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973); Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
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2. Threshold Determinations
In June of 1976, the Court rendered two more decisions revers-
ing circuit court judgments declaring that federal agencies had
failed to comply with NEPA. Both cases involved the threshold
question of whether the agencies had to prepare impact state-
ments. While the first of these decisions could plausibly be dis-
missed as an exceptional case analogous to SCRAP, the other more
obviously manifested a general attitude of deference.
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association 18 in-
volved the question of whether the Secretary of Housing and Ur-
ban Development had to prepare an impact statement before al-
lowing a land developer's registration statement to become
effective. The Secretary argued that his action did not constitute
major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment because he lacked authority to take environ-
mental factors into account in deciding whether a disclosure state-
ment should become effective. However, the Supreme Court re-
fused to decide that question. Instead, the Court relied on the "to
the fullest extent possible" language in section 102 of NEPA, find-
ing it to be a recognition "that where a clear and unavoidable con-
flict in statutory authority exists, NEPA must give way. "219 In the
Court's view, the provision of the Disclosure Act that conflicted
with NEPA was the section providing that disclosure statements
would become effective within thirty days, subject to the Secre-
tary's authority to suspend the effective date if a disclosure state-
ment was "on its face incomplete or inaccurate in any material re-
spect. '220 Since the preparation of an environmental impact
statement within thirty days was not feasible, 2 the result was "a
clear and fundamental conflict of statutory duty," making NEPA's
impact statement requirement "inapplicable. '222
The other 1976 decision, Kleppe v. Sierra Club,22' followed the
SCRAP decision by strictly limiting the obligation to prepare an
impact statement to situations where a "proposal" for federal ac-
tion already existed. Kleppe involved a challenge to the federal
218. 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
219. Id. at 787-88.
220. Id. at 789-90.
221. Id. at 788-89.
222. Id. at 791.
223. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
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government's failure to prepare an impact statement analyzing
coal development in the northern Great Plains region of the
United States. In ordering the government to prepare such a re-
gional statement, the District of Columbia Circuit expanded its
four-part SIPI test to apply to situations where the government
"anticipated" a proposal for a major federal action significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment.224 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed the court of appeals, holding that no re-
gional impact statement was required because the government had
not yet produced "a report or recommendation on a proposal for
major federal action with respect to the ...region. 221
The government itself acknowledged the existence of two types
of federal proposals regarding coal development: a national pro-
gram for coal leasing on federal lands, and localized decisions al-
lowing development at specific sites. Moreover, the government
also recognized its responsibility to prepare impact statements on
any of these proposals that significantly affected the environment;
it had prepared a "Coal Programmatic" statement on the national
program as well as statements for individual mining sites. But the
government contended, and the Supreme Court agreed, that it had
no responsibility to prepare an impact statement with respect to
the northern Great Plains region because "there is no evidence in
the record of an action or a proposal for an action of regional
scope. '226
The Court also rejected the argument that the government had
to prepare a regional impact statement addressing "all coal-related
projects in the region" because the various projects were intimately
related.227 In rejecting this attack on the government's decision
"not to prepare one comprehensive impact statement on all pro-
posed projects in the region," the Court announced an extremely
deferential standard of judicial review. The Court concluded that
the plaintiffs could prevail only if they showed the government ac-
ted "arbitrarily" when it declined to prepare one comprehensive
statement.228 Under this very narrow standard of review, Kleppe
upheld the government's determination to rely on "basins, drain-
224. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For an explanation of the SIPI
holding, see supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
225. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 398-402.
226. Id. at 400.
227. Id. at 408.
228. Id. at 409-12.
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age areas, and other factors" in establishing the scope of state-
ments as a nonarbitrary decision concerning a matter "assigned to
the special competence of the appropriate agencies."22 9
Three years later (and one year after the promulgation of the
CEQ regulations), the Court continued the trend toward narrow
construction of NEPA's statutory terms in Andrus v. Sierra
Club.23 Andrus raised the question of whether NEPA required the
preparation of impact statements on appropriation requests. A
unanimous Court, again reversing the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit,2 1 held that it did not.
According to Andrus, impact statements were not required for
appropriation requests because the requests were neither proposals
for "legislation" nor proposals for "major federal action." In hold-
ing that appropriation requests were not proposals for legislation,
the Court relied on two factors: the administrative interpretation
adopted in the CEQ regulations'32 and the distinction that con-
gressional rules drew between "legislation" and "appropria-
tions. '233 The Court reasoned that appropriation requests are not
properly described as "proposals for. . major federal actions" be-
cause such a description "distorts the language of the Act, since
appropriation requests do not 'propose' federal actions at all; they
instead fund actions already proposed. '234 In addition, requiring
impact statements would be repetitive. Since the agency would
have to prepare a statement if any program revisions it proposed
in response to budget cuts would significantly affect the environ-
ment, requiring the agency "to include an [impact statement] with
its revised appropriation requests would merely be redundant. '235
3. Impact Statements
The only Supreme Court decision that has considered the ade-
quacy of an impact statement was Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.236 Ver-
mont Yankee involved consolidated challenges to several licensing
229. Id. at 414.
230. 442 U.S. 347 (1979).
231. Id. at 355, rev'g 581 F.2d 895 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
232. Id. at 356-59.
233. Id. at 359-61.
234. Id. at 361-62.
235. Id. at 363.
236. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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decisions of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The general
theme of the Supreme Court's opinion severely criticized the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit for its lack of deference to the Commis-
sion. Most of the claims involved the Atomic Energy Act rather
than NEPA, but one basis for the decision of the court of appeals
was its conclusion that the impact statement for one of the plants
was inadequate because it failed to address "energy conservation"
as an alternative to the construction of new nuclear power
facilities.
The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the lower court's ap-
proach to the NEPA issue. According to Justice Rehnquist's ma-
jority opinion, "the concept of 'alternatives' is an evolving one, re-
quiring the agency to explore more or fewer alternatives as they
become better known and understood. 237 Emphasizing that courts
had to review decisions with regard to the alternatives available to
the agency at the time the decision was made, the majority argued
that the actions of the AEC's Licensing Board "were well within
the proper bounds of its statutory authority" when judged by that
standard.238 At the time of the AEC decision, energy conservation's
potential as an alternative to the construction of new facilities had
been given "little thought in government circles" and the adminis-
trative record indicated that the proposed project was actually
needed. In light of these factors, one could not fairly characterize
the board's failure to consider energy conservation as an alterna-
tive as "arbitrary and capricious." Moreover, nothing in NEPA au-
thorized a reviewing court to "substitute its judgment for that of
the agency."2 9
4. Review of Substantive Decisions
A 1980 decision extended the court's deferential approach to
NEPA to decisions reviewing the merits of agency decisions. In
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,240 the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) justified its
refusal to choose environmentally preferable sites for low-income
housing on the grounds that relocation of the project would result
in an unacceptable delay of two years. The Second Circuit set
237. Id. at 552-53.
238. Id. at 553.
239. Id. at 554-55 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
240. 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam).
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aside HUD's decision, holding that it conflicted with the substan-
tive requirement of NEPA that "environmental factors, such as
crowding low-income housing into a concentrated area should be
given determinative weight,"24' but the Supreme Court summarily
reversed without even granting plenary review on the merits. The
per curiam opinion, quoting Vermont Yankee, emphasized that
NEPA's requirements are "essentially procedural." Beyond these
procedural requirements, the court's "only role . . . is to insure
that the agency has considered the environmental consequences";
it has no authority to "interject itself within the area of discretion
of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken."2 42 Since
HUD had satisfied the procedural requirements of NEPA and had
"considered the environmental consequences of its decision," it
had complied with NEPA,243 and the Second Circuit's judgment
setting aside its decision was reversed.
5. Recent Limitations on Judicial Review
The Supreme Court has rendered three additional NEPA opin-
ions since its per curiam decision in Strycker's Bay. Although all
involved relatively narrow NEPA issues, they nonetheless confirm
the Court's deferential attitude toward NEPA review.
The case of Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii244 involved
an attempt to force the Department of the Navy to prepare an im-
pact statement analyzing the environmental effects of constructing
and operating a facility capable of storing nuclear weapons. Re-
versing the Ninth Circuit,245 the Court held that the plaintiffs had
failed to show "that the Navy . . . failed to comply . . . with
NEPA's requirements for the preparation and public disclosure" of
an impact statement. 46 Weinberger relied on Kleppe for the pro-
position that mere construction of a facility capable of storing nu-
clear weapons did not require preparation of an impact statement
regarding the hazards of storing nuclear weapons. To the contrary,
NEPA required such a statement only after a Navy "proposal" to
store nuclear weapons at the facility came into existence. Because
241. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1978).
242. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227, (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
243. Id. at 227-28 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
244. 454 U.S. 139 (1981).
245. Id. at 140-41, rev'g 643 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1980).
246. Id. at 142.
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the location of the weapons storage facilities was classified, the
Navy could "neither admit nor deny" that it planned to use any
particular facility to store nuclear weapons. Without this informa-
tion, the plaintiffs could not prove the existence of the requisite
"proposal for ...major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment," and thus they could not es-
tablish the Navy's duty to prepare an impact statement.241
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy2 48
arose out of the accident at one of the nuclear generators at Three
Mile Island. In deciding whether to allow the undamaged nuclear
facility at the site to resume operations, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission declined to consider whether the resumption would
adversely affect the psychological health of residents in the area.
The Supreme Court upheld that decision.
The Metropolitan Edison opinion began with the premise that
NEPA's primary aim was to require agencies to consider "the ef-
fect of their proposed actions on the physical environment." To
effectuate this aim, the Court limited the environmental effects
that NEPA required agencies to consider to those that bear "a rea-
sonably close causal relationship to a change in the physical envi-
ronment." The psychological effects alleged in Metropolitan
Edison failed to satisfy that requirement because they flowed from
the risk that an accident might occur in the future rather than
from a direct change in physical environment. The effect of this
"element of risk" was to lengthen "the causal chain beyond the
reach of NEPA. '24
9
Less than two months after the decision in Metropolitan Edison,
the Supreme Court continued its deferential approch in Baltimore
Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.250
In Baltimore Gas & Electric, the Court upheld the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission's "zero-release" assumption for permanent stor-
age of nuclear wastes. The adoption of this assumption directed
licensing boards to ignore the possibility that nuclear wastes might
escape from their permanent storage repositories when conducting
licensing hearings for individual plants. After detailing the careful
consideration that the agency had given to the issue, the Court ap-
247. Id. at 146.
248. 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
249. Id. at 1560-62.
250. 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
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plied the "arbitrary and capricious" standard in sustaining the
merits of the agency's approach. Emphasizing the limited purpose
of the zero-release assumption, the conservative character of the
agency's assumptions as a whole, and the "special expertise" of the
NRC on the subject, the Court unanimously concluded that the
assumption fell "within the bounds of reasoned decision-
making."'2 51
6. The Cumulative Impact of the Decisions
If the Supreme Court decisions are considered individually, one
can explain each of them as a narrow exception to broad NEPA
duties. The SCRAP decisions reflected the extreme deference af-
forded to ICC decisions regarding the scope of general rate hear-
ings. Flint Ridge Development Co. involved a case of physical im-
possibility. Kleppe refused to force agencies to prepare the impact
statements for programs that did not exist. Andrus followed a
traditional congressional distinction between legislation and appro-
priations. Vermont Yankee struck down an overzealous application
of the reasonableness test for reviewing impact statements. Stryck-
er's Bay and Baltimore Gas & Electric followed the earlier circuit
decisions and limited substantive review to the question of
whether the agency action was arbitrary and capricious. Wein-
berger recognized that even NEPA had to give way to national se-
curity. Metropolitan Edison insured that the term "environmen-
tal" would not be defined so broadly as to dilute its protection of
the physical environment.
When the Supreme Court decisions are viewed as a group, they
are much more difficult to harmonize with the careful scrutiny of
the early circuit decisions. First, all of the Court's decisions have
reversed circuit court decisions that the Court believed extended
NEPA too far; none have overturned lower court decisions because
they failed to go far enough, and none have affirmed expansive
lower court decisions. Second, the Supreme Court's opinions sub-
stituted a deference to agency determinations" 2 for Calvert Cliffs'
determination to prevent congressional purposes from being "lost
251. Id. at 2257.
252. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Proj. 454 U.S. 139,
146-47 (1981); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976); cf. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S.
347, 357-58 (1979) (deference to CEQ interpretation of NEPA).
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in the vast hallways of the bureaucracy. s5 3 Third, the Supreme
Court opinions frequently supplanted the "reasonableness" lan-
guage of circuit court decisions 54 with the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" terminology.255 As a group then, the decisions suggest that
the Supreme Court has been trying to instruct lower federal courts
to show more restraint in reviewing NEPA decisions.
B. The Response of the Circuits
The decisions of the last several years suggest that the message
of restraint may be reaching the courts of appeal. Moreover, the
influence seems to have gone beyond inducing compliance with the
Supreme Court's express holdings.256 Although exceptions can still
be found,2 57 recent decisions reflect greater willingness by the lower
courts to accept negative threshold determinations 258 and to find
impact statements adequate.259 Moreover, they also seem less will-
ing to bring private or state actions within the federal umbrella,60
253. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
254. See supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
255. E.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 103 S.
Ct. 2246, 2249 (1983); Strycker's Bay, Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
228 n.2 (1980); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 554 (1978); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412, 414 (1976).
256. Lower federal courts have generally rejected arguments that the Supreme Court's
NEPA opinions should be narrowly confined to their particular facts. See, e.g., Conservation
Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976) (following SCRAP);
Laine v. Weinberger, 541 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (following Catholic Action).
257. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Johnston v. Davis,
698 F.2d 1088 (10th Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983); California
v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982); Manatee County v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 778 (M.D.
Fla. 1982).
258. See, e.g., City of Alexandria v. Helms, 728 F.2d 643 (4th Cir. 1984); Town of Orange-
town v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1983); City of New York v. United States Dep't of
Transp., 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1403 (1984); Save Our Wet-
lands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1983); American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Watt,
694 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lopez v. Coco Lagoon Dev. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 188 (D.P.R.
1983); City of Loveland v. Pierce, 564 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
259. See, e.g., California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Township of Springfield
v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1983); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 685
F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1982); James River Flood Control Ass'n v. Watt, 553 F. Supp. 1284
(D.S.D. 1982); Citizens to Preserve Wilderness Park, Inc. v. Adams, 543 F. Supp. 21 (D.
Neb. 1981).
260. See, e.g., Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 610 F.2d 322
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980); Atlanta Coalition on Transp. Crisis, Inc. v.
Atlanta Regional Comm'n, 599 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1979); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.,
584 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1978); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish
Comm'n, 550 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. Fla. 1982); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana
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and they have remained deferential to agency decisions on the
merits.26 1 A significant part of the increased acceptance may stem
from both a greater willingness to prepare impact statements in
obvious cases and from the improved quality of the statements due
to more experience. 26 2 However, the more deferential attitude re-
flected in recent Supreme Court decisions probably deserves at
least some of the credit.
Perhaps the best example of the direct influence of the Supreme
Court decisions can be seen in the more frequent use of the "arbi-
trary and capricious" language in describing the scope of judicial
review. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Kleppe has not
completely reversed the trend toward the reasonableness standard
for reviewing threshold determinations,2 63 it has prompted the
First and Fourth circuits264 to join the Second2 65 and Seventh2 66 in
using the "arbitrary and capricious" approach. Similarly, the "ar-
bitrary and capricious" language has crept into a number of cases
reviewing the adequacy of impact statements, 267 and even the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has emphasized the substantial role of
agency discretion in determining whether the time is ripe for the
preparation of a programmatic impact statement.26 s
Laws v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 545 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1982).
261. See South La. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1980);
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 1980); cf. Grazing
Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 (1st Cir. 1980) (dictum).
262. The annual reports of the CEQ indicate that federal agencies have averaged more
than 1000 impact statements a year between 1970 and 1981. See 1982 U.S. CouNcIL ON
ENVTL. QUALITY, THIRTEENTH ANN. REP. ON ENVTL. QUALITY 314 (Table A-82); 1976 U.S.
COUNCIL, supra note 108, at 124 (Table 1-33).
263. See Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1982); Concord
Township v. United States, 625 F.2d 1068, 1073 (3d Cir. 1980) (dictum); City of San Fran-
cisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 500 (9th Cir. 1980).
264. Providence Road Community Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Agency, 683 F.2d
80, 82 (4th Cir. 1982); Aertsen v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1980).
265. See, e.g., Cross-Sound Ferry Serv., Inc. v. United States, 573 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1978).
266. See, e.g., City of West Chicago v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 701
F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983).
267. See, e.g., Citizens for Mass Transit, Inc. v. Adams, 630 F.2d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 1980);
Farmland Preservation Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 611 F.2d 233, 239 (8th Cir. 1979). But see,
e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983) (ap-
plying rule of reason).
268. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Appalachian Regional Comm'n, 677 F.2d 883, 888-90
(D.C. Cir. 1981); cf. Committee for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 1002-03
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Committee for Auto Responsibility v. Freeman, 445
U.S. 915 (1980) (using standards of "acted arbitrarily," "reasonable interpretation," and
"rule of reason" interchangeably).
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VI. NEPA's CURRENT IMPACT
A. The Cause for Skepticism
The decisions summarized in the preceding section appear to
justify considerable skepticism about NEPA's contemporary signif-
icance. One is tempted to agree with Professor Sax that NEPA's
faith in rationality and procedure was naive. Because NEPA failed
to change the institutional pressures on federal agencies, it has not
significantly affected the decisions those agencies make. As a re-
sult, the public has received little in the way of an improved envi-
ronment, and the only real beneficiaries have been the consultants
who prepare impact statements for the agencies and the law
professors who still have a seemingly endless stream of environ-
mentally objectionable decisions to criticize.
The most obvious and consistent failure of the NEPA cases has
been the courts' inability to develop a standard that would permit
more than perfunctory review of the merits of agency decisions.
The early cases presaged this failure, but hopeful environmental-
ists could still explain them away. Initially, Calvert Cliffs' referred
to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard as the guide for sub-
stantive review, but that reference was qualified by the adverb
"probably" and came in dicta. Although Gilham Dam converted
the Calvert Cliffs' dicta to holding, it involved a dam that was al-
most complete at the time NEPA was enacted. However, such ex-
planations ring false after Strycker's Bay. Not only did the Su-
preme Court reverse the only circuit decision to set aside an action
on the merits, it did so summarily without a hearing on the merits,
and its opinion chastised the circuit court for failing to recognize
the "essentially procedural" nature of NEPA's requirements. If
any substantive review remains after Strycker's Bay,16 9 it seems to
be only the relatively toothless "arbitrary and capricious"
standard.
In its other opinions, the Supreme Court has displayed a defer-
ential attitude in reviewing even the "procedural" duties, and re-
cent cases suggest the circuit courts are following this lead. With
respect to the threshold determinations of whether to prepare an
269. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court decision in Strycker's Bay, the CEQ has ad-
vised the Senate Committee on the Environment that NEPA establishes substantive stan-
dards that are judicially enforceable under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See let-
ter from Nicholas C. Yost, CEQ General Counsel, to Philip Cummings, Counsel, U.S. Senate
Committee on the Environment and Public Works (Feb. 4, 1980).
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impact statement, the courts have been willing to accept agency
determinations about the timing of statement preparation,27 0 the
reach of statutory terms,2 1 and the significance of environmental
harm 272 In reviewing the adequacy of impact statements, recent
decisions have generally been willing to accept good faith attempts
at compliance. 273 Taken as a group, these decisions lessen the like-
lihood of securing even the temporary relief won in the early
NEPA cases-delaying the action until the agency prepared or im-
proved an impact statement.
Finally, recent Supreme Court decisions make it possible to ar-
gue that some of the early NEPA cases were wrong and should be
abandoned. As the preceding section indicated, the most obvious
candidate is the "reasonableness" standard for reviewing threshold
determinations, 274 and at least two circuits have already moved in
that direction. 7 5 The deferential attitude emphasized in Vermont
Yankee 271 could also support a similar argument with respect to
the adequacy of impact statements. Finally, the narrow definition
of NEPA terminology and deference to agency definitions en-
dorsed in cases such as Kleppe,277 Andrus,27s and Metropolitan
Edison27 9 could support a reconsideration of the looser and less
deferential approach reflected in circuit decisions such as
MPIRG, 280  Green County,2 sl and Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Morton.2
270. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Ap-
palachian Regional Comm'n, 677 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
271. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, Inc., 460 U.S.
766 (1983); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979); Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 610 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1980); Atlanta Coalition on Transp. Crisis, Inc.
v. Atlanta Regional Comm'n, 599 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1979).
272. See, e.g., City of New York v. United States Dep't of Transp., 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir.
1983); Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1983); Smith v. Soil Conser-
vation Serv., 563 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Greenpeace Seattle v. Weinberger, 17
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1209 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
273. See cases cited supra at note 259.
274. See supra notes 55-74, 147 and accompanying text.
275. Providence Road Community Ass'n v. EPA, 683 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1982); Aertsen v.
Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1980).
276. See supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
DOES NEPA MATTER?
B. The Continuing Importance of NEPA
Closer study of the NEPA decisions tends to allay some of the
pessimism noted in the preceding subsection. Even if one acknowl-
edges that NEPA has failed to alter agency mandates or to induce
agencies to abandon development of environmentally questionable
projects and that recent decisions have established a framework
permitting the repudiation of many early NEPA decisons, careful
analysis suggests that general repudiation of the early decisions is
unlikely and that NEPA can still have an impact on agency
decisions.
1. Vitality of the Early Precedents
Two factors combine to suggest that a general repudiation of the
early NEPA doctrines is unlikely: (1) favorable citations to many
of these decisions in the most deferential of the Supreme Court
opinions, and (2) the CEQ's regulatory codification of many of the
substantive rules established in the early cases. Taken together,
these two factors indicate that the doctrines outlined in the earlier
circuit court decisions are likely to remain authoritative in the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, some recent cases suggest that
the courts of appeal have not completely abandoned the careful
scrutiny characteristic of the early decisions."8 3
Two of the most deferential Supreme Court opinions, Kleppe
and Vermont Yankee, contain favorable citations to some of the
more expansive circuit court decisions. For example, in Kleppe,8 4
the Court cited both SIPI,2s5 which applied a balancing test to de-
termine when a research proposal was sufficiently developed to re-
quire the preparation of an impact statement, and Davis v. Mor-
ton,286 which held that impact statements were required before the
federal government could permit private actions that would signifi-
cantly affect the environment. Similarly, in the portion of the Ver-
mont Yankee opinion that confirmed the adequacy of the impact
statement prepared with respect to the Midland reactor, the Court
quoted287 from Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Mor-
283. See cases cited supra note 257.
284. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399 (1976).
285. See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
286. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
287. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978) (quoting National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458
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ton,2 s8 which applied a fairly rigorous "reasonableness" standard
for review of impact statements. These favorable citations suggest
that the Court's purpose in its recent decisions has been to retard
the development of new doctrines rather than to reverse existing
rules.
The codification of most of the early substantive rules in the
CEQ regulations s9 makes a wholesale reversal of those rules even
less likely. There are several reasons for this conclusion. First, the
present regulatory basis for these rules makes it extremely difficult
to imagine a judicial challenge to them as too stringent. Moreover,
even if an agency were to challenge those rules today, the legal
issue would not be whether the statutory language of NEPA com-
pels the rule but whether the CEQ's regulatory interpretation was
an appropriate one. Andrus indicates that the Supreme Court
would be reluctant to overrule a CEQ interpretation that could be
regarded as reasonable.290 Of course, the regulatory definitions
could be reversed administratively, but that is unlikely to occur.
The CEQ would almost certainly oppose such reversals to protect
its own administrative turf and other agencies would hesitate to
invest their limited bureaucratic muscle to force changes in rules
with which they have been able to live for a decade or longer. In
addition, political realists in the executive branch would be reluc-
tant to arouse the opposition of environmentalists over an issue
that does not directly frustrate either government programs or pri-
vate enterprise initiatives.
In sum, the contribution of the early NEPA decisions is likely to
prove enduring. The "procedural" duties of NEPA will remain ju-
dicially enforceable, and agencies will probably continue to pro-
duce large numbers of impact statements. At a minimum, NEPA
will remain valuable for environmental consultants and law
professors.
F.2d 827, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
288. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 194-210 and accompanying text.
290. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) ("CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is
entitled to substantial deference."). A footnote in Baltimore Gas raises the possibility that
"independent" federal agencies may not be bound by the CEQ regulations. Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2254 n.12 (1983).
Those agencies have generally adopted their own regulations implementing the rules estab-
lished by the CEQ.
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2. Mitigation of Development Plans
As Professor Sax has persuasively argued,291 requiring the prepa-
ration of impact statements will not alter the development bias of
many agencies. It may, however, affect the way that development
projects are implemented.
Even if fundamental environmental issues normally involve hard
choices which turn on values more than information, many specific
decisions may involve choices between competing methods of ac-
complishing an agency objective. In those situations, the informa-
tion generated in the preparation of an impact statement may ei-
ther induce the agency to choose the method of achieving the
objective that will cause less environmental damage, or it may sug-
gest a way of accomplishing the objective that was not immediately
apparent. Thus, NEPA may induce an agency to choose an envi-
ronmentally preferable alternative that does not seriously compro-
mise the agency's basic objectives, especially when ignoring the en-
vironmentally preferable alternative may involve the agency in
time-consuming litigation.
Professor Sax's own illustration furnishes an example of how
NEPA can affect agency decisions at the implementation stage.
His criticism of impact statements on airport expansion for consid-
ering only three options-"build the proposed new runway; build a
new airport elsewhere; or adopt . . . 'the do-nothing alterna-
tive' " 29-may be valid for some expansion projects,29 but exten-
sive comparisons of alternative locations for the expansion is surely
possible even after one has decided to expand. Since even an unde-
sirable airport expansion can be constructed on more or less desir-
able sites in terms of its impact on the environment, the statement
may help persuade the agency to choose the more desirable loca-
tion. The point here is a simple one: NEPA's failure to give envi-
ronmental factors primacy at the planning level should not blind
one to its possibilities at the implementation level.
291. Sax, supra note 175.
292. Id. at 245.
293. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 470 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
961 (1974) ("The [impact statement] contains a brief discussion of four alternatives to the
proposed construction of the Reef Runway extension. Three involve various runway con-
cepts and configurations, and the fourth, the alternative of taking no action.").
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3. Compliance with Regulatory Obligations
Now that detailed regulatory schemes implementing NEPA exist
throughout the federal government, opponents of agency action
may rely on the requirements in these regulations to establish min-
imal standards of NEPA compliance. Although agency regulations
may not dilute statutory responsibilities, they can go beyond judi-
cially imposed obligations in fulfilling the environmental mandate
that NEPA has made "supplementary to those set forth in existing
authorizations of Federal agencies."294 Moreover, to the extent that
environmentalists can uncover regulations that impose such limits
on agency conduct, they need not convince the reviewing court
that NEPA itelf imposes the obligation.
The "mitigation" provisions of the CEQ regulations offer one ex-
ample of regulatory mandated obligations that may exceed the
minimum requirements imposed by NEPA.295 In at least three re-
spects, these provisions establish standards that have not been im-
posed in judicial proceedings. First, they expressly require impact
statements to discuss appropriate mitigation measures"'6 and to
explain any failure to condition the preferred alternative on the
implementation of all practical means to minimize environmental
harm. 297 Second, they require "cooperating" agencies that object to
a proposal to specify the mitigation measures that would make the
proposal acceptable .298 Third, they require agencies to implement
"[m]itigation . . . and other conditions . . . committed as part of
the decision. "299
Because the mitigation provisions have been imposed by regula-
tions, enforcing them is fully consistent with the deference to ad-
ministrative authority reflected in recent cases. Therefore, they
may serve as the basis for the next series of NEPA cases. Similarly,
294. 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1982).
295. The requirement that agencies make a "worst case" analysis in situations that would
involve severe, but uncertain, impacts on the environment is another example of a regula-
tory directive that probably goes beyond the statute. See Southern Or. Citizens Against
Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3366
(U.S. Nov. 13, 1984); United States v. 101.80 Acres of Land, 716 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1983);
Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1983); Yost, Don't
Gut Worst Case Analysis, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 10,394 (1983).
296. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h) (1983).
297. Id. § 1505.2(c).
298. Id. § 1403.3(d).
299. Id. § 1505.3.
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careful attention to the regulations of particular agencies 00 may
generate like obligations that apply to specific situations.
4. Interaction with Other Statutes
The preceding discussion suggests a role for NEPA that one
might charitably describe as modest. It forces agencies to prepare
statements for many actions, it may affect the implementation of
decision making, and regulatory requirements may impose addi-
tional procedural obligations. But the discussion concedes that
NEPA has neither altered agency biases nor provided a vehicle for
judicial reversal of substantive decision. Surely, a more important
role than this is required if NEPA is to merit recognition as an
important environmental statute.
One way that NEPA may substantially affect decision making is
through its interaction with other statutes that impose substantive
environmental obligations. Through this interaction, NEPA may
aid plaintiffs in securing substantive relief in a judicial proceeding
even though NEPA's own substantive duties are nonexistent or at
least judicially unenforcible. To the extent that other statutes limit
agency authority to undertake environmentally harmful action,
NEPA's procedural duties may provide plaintiffs with information
that will enable them to show that the substantive limits have
been violated.
The snail darter litigation provides a well-known illustration of
this interaction between NEPA and other statutes. Although the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) had begun construction of the
Tellico dam in Tennessee before NEPA was enacted, a federal
court eventually enjoined its completion until an impact statement
was prepared.301 After TVA completed the environmental study
mandated by NEPA, the district court dissolved its injunction and
TVA elected to complete the dam. 2 By this time, however, a re-
searcher had discovered a new species of perch, the snail darter.
300. The CEQ regulations require each agency to revise its NEPA regulations to conform
to the CEQ provisions. Id. § 1507.3. For the NEPA regulations of various agencies, see 7
C.F.R. § 3100 (1979) (Agriculture Department); 44 Fed. Reg. 44,718 (1979) (Forest Service);
32 C.F.R. § 214 (1979) (Department of Defense); 44 Fed. Reg. 56,420 (1979) (Department of
Transportation); 40 C.F.R. § 6 (1979) (EPA).
301. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.
Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
302. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973), afl'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974).
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Environmentalists persuaded the Secretary of the Interior to list
the snail darter as an "endangered species" and the area to be
flooded by the Tellico dam as a "critical habitat" for the snail
darter. Consequently, the Endangered Species Act30 3 required all
federal agencies to ensure that their actions would not result in the
destruction of that habitat. Because the operation of the Tellico
dam would be inconsistent with that substantive obligation, the
Supreme Court upheld an injunction forbidding the dam's opera-
tion, °4 and it was not placed in service until Congress passed a
special statute permitting it to begin operations.306
Other statutes also impose obligations to protect the environ-
ment or to consider specific environmental impacts. Most apply to
particular agencies,30 6 but a few impose such responsibilities on all
303. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
304. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
305. Pub. L. No. 96-96, 93 Stat. 437, 449 (1979). See generally Plater, Reflected in a
River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REv. 747, 783-84
(1982).
306. The Department of Transportation Act is an example of a statute that contains such
a substantive limit on agency authority. It prohibits the Secretary of Transportation from
approving any project that uses publicly owned land from a park recreation area, wildlife
refuge, or historic site "unless ... there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of
such land." 49 U.S.C. § 303 (1982); see also 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1982) (Federal Highway Act);
49 U.S.C. app. § 1610 (1982) (mass transit construction). As authoritatively construed by the
Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), this
language allows the use of parkland "only [in] the most unusual circumstances." Although
the statute does not require the Secretary to ignore "cost and disruption of the community,"
it does establish a substantive rule requiring "that protection of parkland . . . be given
paramount importance" and allowing the destruction of parkland only when "alternative
routes present unique problems." Id. at 412-13.
The interaction between NEPA and the Transportation Act is obvious. Since construction
of a highway through a park would normally have a significant impact on the environment,
NEPA requires discussion of all reasonable alternatives in an impact statement, and the
Transportation Act prohibits the use of the parkland unless the Secretary finds no alterna-
tive is "feasible and prudent." Thus, the failure to discuss a reasonable alternative renders
the statement inadequate and the Secretary's determination arbitrary and capricious. See,
e.g., Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1980). The result
under the two statutes would not be identical, however, if the statement documented a fea-
sible alternative. NEPA allows the Secretary to give priority to general development goals
and ignore the feasible alternative, but the Transportation Act requires him to choose the
alternative that avoids the use of parkland.
Not surprisingly, most of the pro-environmental decisions under the Transportation Act
have involved a failure to consider the feasibility of rejected alternatives. See, e.g., Benton
Franklin Riverfront Trailway & Bridge Comm. v. Lewis, 701 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1983). None-
theless, the substantive duty provides the basis for review of the merits of the decisions, and
it has at least occasionally served as the basis for a decision not to approve the use of park-
land. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
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federal agencies. °7 Wherever these substantive obligations exist,
NEPA's procedural requirements that agencies analyze environ-
mental impacts and develop alternatives 3° can provide an impor-
tant aid to those seeking to enforce these obligations, especially in
view of the Supreme Court's recent aversion to judicial imposition
of procedural protections that go beyond those explicitly imposed
in substantive statutes. 9
5. The Political Value of Impact Statements
The preceding sections demonstrate that NEPA does impose ju-
dicially enforceable obligations and that these obligations cannot
be dismissed as inconsequential. However, these judicially enforce-
able obligations do not fully explain NEPA's contemporary signifi-
cance. NEPA's procedural requirements, particularly the duty to
prepare impact statements, can serve an important role for envi-
ronmentalists; but appreciating that role requires one to look be-
yond the judicial forum to the political arena. The production of
impact statements can assist environmental groups in their politi-
cal struggles against agency decisions by providing two indispensa-
ble prerequisites to effective political action: information and time.
In effect, the statements are a necessary, but not a sufficient, ele-
ment of effective political action. They make such action possible
although they do not ensure that political activism will materialize
or that the political action will be effective if it does materialize.
With respect to information, NEPA serves as an affirmative free-
dom of information act. Agencies frequently justify refusals to pro-
vide citizens with requested information on the ground that the
information is not contained within any agency record. It has been
held that the lack of a record is a sufficient justification to deny a
request 310 under the Freedom of Information Act.31' NEPA pre-
cludes this response, however. If an agency proposes a major fed-
307. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b) (1982) (each agency administering a "wilderness" area
"shall be responsible for preserving the wilderness character of the area"); 16 U.S.C. § 470(f)
(1982) (duty to "take into account" the impact of federal activities on sites included in, or
eligible for inclusion in, the National Register).
308. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), (E) (1982); see supra notes 102-07, 152-56 and accompa-
nying text.
309. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542-48 (1978).
310. See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152
(1980).
311. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
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eral action significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, it must develop information concerning the environmental
impacts of the proposal and provide this information to the public.
Armed with this information, those who oppose the proposal can
lobby the political branches (i.e., Congress and the President) in
order to defeat the proposal.
Without such information, the lobbying of environmental activ-
ists would be far less effective. The preparation of impact state-
ments is expensive, and environmental organizations (especially ad
hoc groups formed to oppose specific projects) generally lack the
resources to generate the information themselves. By forcing agen-
cies to assume that financial burden, NEPA provides a basic ingre-
dient for meaningful public debate.
Time is a second prerequisite of effective political action, and
NEPA grants opponents of proposed actions time by lengthening
the lead-time for implementing major federal actions. From "scop-
ing" to final statement, the minimum time for preparation for im-
pact statements is usually at least eighteen months, and the prepa-
ration time is frequently much longer. Not only does this
preparation time provide the opportunity for aggressive lobbying,
it often includes an election in which the issue can be raised. With-
out this lead-time, agency actions would frequently be completed,
or at least well underway, before an effective political opposition
could be organized.
The dispute over basing the MX missile in underground silos
located in Nevada and Utah illustrates how NEPA obligations can
assist political opponents of important governmental actions. Only
the most naive observer would have believed that the Air Force
would decide to abandon its proposal for strategic deterrence be-
cause of the environmental concerns, or that a court was likely to
force it to do so. Nonetheless, the preparation of the impact state-
ment on the basing plan did contribute to the abandonment of the
basing program. The quantification of such impacts as those the
construction program would have on the construction industry and
on population growth helped arm opponents with political ammu-
nition. 12 More importantly, the time consumed in preparing the
statements helped delay the basing decision until after the election
of a new President who eventually declared his opposition to the
312. See Effects of MX Will be Significant, But Manageable, According to Air Force, 11




Seen in this light, NEPA's greatest significance may lie less in
the substantive duties it imposes, and more in the political oppor-
tunity it affords. While that political opportunity may be less than
environmentalists would like, it may be as much as they deserve in
a democratically responsible society.
From this perspective, Weinberger and People Against Nuclear
Energy, the two most recent Supreme Court decisions, appear omi-
nous because they both qualify this duty to generate information
for the public. To preserve the political value of statements, it is
important for the exceptions they have created to be narrowly cir-
cumscribed. Future decisions should, therefore, reconfirm that the
duty to analyze environmental impacts encompasses all impacts
closely connected to the physical environment and that NEPA
does not include a "military" exemption but only an exception al-
lowing the government to withhold information that would com-
promise properly classified material.
VII. CONCLUSION
The NEPA story recounted in these pages illustrates both the
possibilities and the limits of judicial implementation of statutes
establishing general environmental mandates. Following Judge
Wright's lead in Calvert Cliffs', lower federal courts defined the
vague terms of NEPA in ways that changed the procedures used
by federal agencies (especially development agencies) in making
decisions with significant impacts on the environment. Eventually,
however, the courts proved unable to establish meaningful stan-
dards for restraining substantive decisions that harm the environ-
ment. Furthermore, the courts have relaxed their review of proce-
dural decisions now that agencies have begun to comply with their
obligations with some regularity and an agency with environmental
expertise (the CEQ) has assumed increased regulatory oversight of
NEPA's procedural duties.
The NEPA cases clearly caution those concerned about the envi-
ronment against overreliance on procedural mechanisms or, more
generally, overreliance on the judiciary as the primary instrument
for protecting the environment. To the extent that environmental-
ists wish to use law to restrain government actions harmful to the
313. See 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 709 (1981).
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environment, specific statutory prohibitions against those actions
are far more likely to accomplish that object than procedural re-
quirements or general substantive mandates. Drafting such
prohibitions requires proceeding on a time-consuming, agency-by-
agency basis, but less burdensome approaches are unlikely to be as
effective. Perhaps more importantly, the NEPA cases warn envi-
ronmental activists that ultimate victory on environmental issues
is more likely to come from a changed political consensus than
from revised statutory formulas. Without strong and constant po-
litical encouragement and review, bureaucrats are unlikely to alter
development or other agency goals and courts are unlikely to re-
quire them to do so. It is unrealistic to expect general statutory
exhortations to alter this reality.
A realistic review of the NEPA decisions requires an acknowl-
edgment of the statute's limits as an instrument for controlling en-
vironmentally harmful action by the government. On the other
hand, that same review reveals that NEPA remains a valuable
weapon in the arsenal of environmental opponents of governmental
action. By expanding NEPA's terms to establish judicially enforce-
able requirements, courts forced the government to identify envi-
ronmental issues and to analyze environmental impacts and alter-
natives. These analyses have, at least occasionally, affected
government proposals at the implementation stage. NEPA also
provides the basis for the regulations of CEQ and individual agen-
cies; these regulations, which the courts will also enforce, codify
and sometimes expand judicially-imposed responsibilities. Finally,
the information generated in the fulfillment of NEPA's "proce-
dural" duties may affect substantive decision making in two other
ways by providing grounds for enforcing the substantive duties of
other environmental statutes and by providing information and
time, two necessary elements of effective political action.
In sum, NEPA has clearly failed to fulfill the hopes generated by
Calvert Cliffs' and its early progeny. It has, however, had a greater
impact on governmental operations than most of its proponents
would have predicted when it was enacted, and it remains an im-
portant environmental statute that has practical significance to-
day. Perhaps, therefore, the final appraisal should be a sympa-
thetic one that remains less impressed by the power of the
entrenched bureaucracy than by the impact that NEPA has had.
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